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Whereas a lot of research on social problems has focused on understanding them as objective 
conditions, the purpose of this study is to examine how terrorism is framed in three Swedish 
policies for countering terrorism. The three Swedish policies for countering terrorism, included 
in this study, were published between 2008-2015, and are important platforms wherein the 
framing of terrorism as a social problem takes place. Drawing on Donileen R. Loseke’s 
perspective on social problems, I have examined the human activity of social problems work; 
this involves looking at how the parameters of the condition is set, and how meaning is created 
within three frames: the diagnostic, motivational, and prognostic frame. By analyzing processes 
of meaning-making, I have shed light on how claim-makers, in a process termed 
“piggybacking”, make the so-called “new” terrorism seem familiar (notwithstanding the prefix 
of “new”) by linking it to an already established problem, namely the “old” terrorism. It is 
argued that the narrative of terrorism encompasses elements of vagueness, the construction of 
identities, and a moral dimension, since it entails ideas pertaining to desirable and undesirable 
lifestyles. I have found that the inherent vagueness of the policies is not necessarily problematic. 
I, rather, suggest that vagueness – in a politically charged context as that of terrorism – may be 
viewed as an asset in that it enables complexity. Additionally, the watchword, collaboration, 
signifies a development, in which the responsibility for crime (terror) prevention and security 
are re-articulated. The notion of collaboration refers to the shared undertaking of terror 
prevention, involving both non-state and state actors. Within this multi-actor approach, which 
is closely linked to the prevention of “early initiatives”, structural accounts of terrorism are 
increasingly overshadowed by individually-orientated explanations. Furthermore, in light of the 
British academic literature on counter-terrorism, the study at hand also comprises reflections 
upon the potential pitfalls of the preventive outlook as to terrorism in Sweden.  
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Populärvetenskaplig presentation 
Den här uppsatsen handlar om hur terrorism framställs i tre svenska policydokument 
publicerade mellan 2008-15. Utgångspunkten är det samhällsvetenskapliga perspektivet 
socialkonstruktivism. Enligt detta perspektiv är verkligheten, eller delar därav, en produkt av 
interaktionen människor emellan. Företeelser som till exempel identitet, förstås således inte 
som naturliga eller förutbestämda, utan snarare som socialt skapade. I uppsatsen analyserar jag 
huvudsakligen hur terrorism som socialt problem konstrueras i tre nationella, svenska, counter-
terrorismstrategier (som syftar till att bekämpa terrorism). Utöver denna frågeställning, har jag 
även undersökt om det finns några skillnader i hur terrorism framställs i de olika strategierna 
och vilka lösningar som föreslås i dessa samt hur den svenska preventiva hållningen gällande 
terrorism kan förstås i ljuset av akademisk, brittisk, counter-terrorismlitteratur.  
För att besvara den första frågeställningen använder jag mig av Donileen R. Losekes perspektiv 
på sociala problem. I skapandet av sociala problem, vilket Loseke refererar till som social 
problems work, finns å ena sidan de personer som via påståenden och uttalanden tillskriver ett 
fenomen mening och framställer det som viktigt (claim-makers), och å den andra de personer 
som dessa påståenden och uttalanden syftar till att övertyga, det vill säga allmänheten (the 
aduience). Loseke identifierar fyra inramningar genom vilka processer av meningsskapande 
belyses. I den första inramningen, grounds, redovisas fakta. I den andra, diagnostic frame, 
besvaras frågan: Vad är det som orsakar problemet? I den tredje, motivational frame, 
konstrueras problemet som viktigt och oroväckande via appeller till emotioner och logik. I den 
fjärde och avslutande inramningen ges förslag på tänkbara problemlösningar. Med hjälp av 
Losekes teoretiska ramverk har jag åskådliggjort hur terrorism framställs dels som en 
förgrening av ett redan etablerat socialt problem (”piggybacking”), dels som ett allvarligt och 
ständigt föränderligt hot. Jag har även påvisat hur identiteter konstrueras och jag har dessutom 
noterat vagheter i strategierna, samt reflekterat kring hur dessa vagheter kan förstås. Därutöver 
har jag även identifierat en utveckling varigenom ansvaret för brottsprevention 
(terrorprevention) förläggs till ”hela samhället”. Gällande förändringar strategierna emellan har 
jag utifrån Ingrid Sahlins tankar om brottsprevention kastat ljus över hur en mer generell 
prevention - i allt högre grad - kommit att ersättas av mer selektiv sådan. Likaså har 
samhälleliga, strukturella förklaringsmodeller hamnat allt mer i skymundan till förmån för mer 
individorienterade förklaringsmodeller. Mot bakgrund av den brittiska litteraturen om counter-
terrorismens oroväckande implikationer har jag, i det svenska materialet, uppmärksammat 
liknande tendenser, till exempel normaliseringen av exceptionella åtgärder.  
A Word of thanks 
 
I would like to give special thanks to my two supervisors David Wästerfors (associate professor 
at Lund university) and Teresa Degenhardt (associate professor at Queen’s university, Belfast). 
Both of you have provided me with guidance and support. Moreover, I wish to thank the 
informants for making the time to contribute.  
Additionally, I would like to thank my family, my boyfriend and; especially, my dear and wise 
friend Daniel Carlsson. Our discussions and his wise comments have been helpful.  
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1. Introduction 
 
During the 21st century, terrorism has engrossed enormous attention. It seems safe to say that 
terrorism, and the prevention of it, as of September 11th 2001, occupies a central position in the 
political agenda in a number of countries (Townshend 2011:2f). Before 1971 the term 
“terrorism” had not been indexed within Swedish parliamentary publications; its recorded use 
has, however, since July 2014, risen to 3,805 in the aforementioned publications (Strandh and 
Eklund 2015:363). Today, one may frequently read terror related news, and, one may just as 
often, hear politicians comment on terrorism and the prevention of it. What’s more, vast 
amounts of public resources are allocated to the Swedish Security Service (SÄPO), which has 
the overall responsibility of preventing terrorism. Solely during the first two decades of the new 
millennium, no less than three national strategies for countering terrorism were issued, in 2008, 
2012 (an updated version of the previous) and 2015.  
Sweden has historically been fairly spared from acts of terror. So, too from acts of terror which, 
especially during the 21st century, has been placed within the framework of the so-called “new” 
terrorism (of which more later) (Strandh and Eklund 2015:360, 363). For this reason, Sweden 
has had a modest experience of discussion on terror prevention, for instance in comparison with 
the United Kingdom (the “troubles” 1969-1998, see McKittrick and McVea 2012). So, Sweden 
has had a scarce experience of terrorism, still the commitment as to prevent terrorism in today’s 
Sweden is seemingly extensive. The said commitment to terror prevention, and the apparent 
societal changes transpiring around me in the Swedish context, is that which sparked my interest 
in studying counter-terrorism.  
The main purpose of the essay at hand is to examine the ways in which terrorism is framed 
within three Swedish national strategies for countering terrorism. I shall try to accomplish this 
by examining how terrorism is constructed as a social problem, using Donilee Loseke’s (2003) 
perspective on social problems. Since the strategies aim to prevent terrorism, I am particularly 
interested in what preventive measures are suggested. Drawing on Ingrid Sahlin’s (2000) 
thoughts on crime prevention, I intend to scrutinize Swedish responses to terrorism. I will 
additionally try to make sense of the Swedish line of thought on counter-terrorism by using 
British literature on the said subject as a backdrop. The British counter-terrorism context is of 
particular interest as a point of reference for the Swedish material; primarily because Great 
Britain has been viewed as having embarked upon a dangerous path (c.f. Mythen, Walklate and 
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Khan 2012); but also due to the fact that the United Kingdom may still be viewed as one of the 
major geopolitical forces in Europe. 
 
2. Material 
 
The empirical material consists of the three latest national strategies for countering terrorism in 
Sweden, and a selection of British literature on counter-terrorism. 
In the following the material is listed by priority: (1) the main source is that of three national 
policy strategies for countering terrorism in Sweden: “Förebygga, Förhindra, Försvåra – Den 
svenska strategin mot terrorism” (Skr. 2014/15:146), ”Ansvar och engagemang – en nationell 
strategi mot terrorism (Skr. 2011/12:73)” and ”Nationellt ansvar och internationellt 
engagemang – En nationell strategi för att möta hotet från terrorism (Skr. 2007/8:64)”.1 The 
strategies are 26 (2008), 40 (2012) and 45 (2015) pages (a total of 111 pages), and they are the 
latest three strategies published in Sweden. My hope is that the three different editions of the 
strategies will allow me to add a time dimension, albeit a modest one, in order to pinpoint 
possible changes in the discourse on terror prevention. Furthermore, (2) The academic literature 
on counter-terrorism in the United Kingdom will function as a sort of contrastive and 
comparative mirror against which the Swedish ideas on counter terrorism will be put. Lastly, 
(3) I have conducted three interviews with two chiefs of security of two Swedish municipalities, 
and a professional working at the the National Centrum for Countering Terrorism.  
 
 
2.1 Three Swedish national strategies for countering terrorism published between 
2008-2015 
 
The Swedish strategy for countering terrorism, Nationellt ansvar och internationellt 
engagemang – En nationell strategi för att möta hotet från terrorism, was published in 2008 
(Skr. 2007/8:64). In the strategy, the Swedish government accounts for the premises from which 
                                                          
1 The official English names of the strategies are follow:  
Prevent, Preempt and Protect - the Swedish Counter-terrorism Strategy (Skr. 2014/15:146).  
National Responsibility and International commitment – A national strategy to meet the threat of terrorism (Skr. 
2011/12:73).  
Responsibility and commitment  A national counter-terrorism strategy (Skr. 2007/8:64).  
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the country’s work against terror will stem. Four headings entitled “Avert”, “Prevent”, 
“Protect” and “Handle the Consequences”, encapsulate the overall intentions of the work. In 
the strategy’s emphasis is placed on the on the work within the frame of “Avert”, which 
addresses efforts from the police and legal system in combating terrorism. The “Prevent” 
section aims at thwarting the root causes of terrorism, and “Protect” is mainly about the 
protection of facilities important to society. The final passage, “Handle the Consequences” 
deals with societal agencies, on different levels, abilities to cope with potential crises.  
The strategy document Ansvar och engagemang – en internationell strategi mot terrorism (Skr. 
2011/12:73) is an update of its precedent from 2008, and is - subsequently - designed in a similar 
manner. Here the government’s work against terror revolves around three parts: the threat 
scenario, premises and aims and measures to combat terrorism. In the first, the threat scenario 
is presented. In the second, Sweden’s outset in the fight against terrorism is accounted for, and 
in the third the Swedish government describes the ways in which Sweden will deal with the 
threat from terrorism. This part revolves around three cornerstones: prevent, preempt and 
prepare.  
The Swedish strategy in force Förebygga, Förhindra, Försvåra – Den svenska strategin mot 
terrorism (Skr. 2014/15:146) replaces the strategy of 2012. It constitutes the outset for 
Sweden’s long-time work in the area of combating terrorism, nationally as well as 
internationally. The explicit aim of the strategy is to ”create a clear structure for the work needed 
to combat terrorist crime” (Skr. 2014/15:1). The text is divided into three parts, reflected in its 
title: prevent, preempt and protect.  
 
2.1.1 Understanding the Swedish context: Events of importance 
 
A first glance at policy documents and the problem representations that are lodged within them, 
one may get the impression that the design was a given. This is certainly not the case. On the 
contrary, the formation of a policy involves numerous twist and turns. Thus, the “givenness” of 
a certain policy may be interrogated by tracing its genealogy (Bacchi 2009:10). As the endeavor 
of conducting a genealogy of terror prevention in Sweden is far too extensive a task to fit within 
the scope of this study – I intend to name a few events which most likely have influenced the 
shaping of the Swedish outlook on terror prevention up until the present. The selection of events 
in the upcoming review, builds on two articles by Sveriges Television (SVT), providing an 
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overview of terror attacks in Sweden since 1908 and 2001 (SVT 2015/1115; SVT 2010/12/13); 
but it also draws inspiration from a passage about focusing events in “Swedish Counterterorrism 
Policy: An Intersection Between Prevention and Mitigation” (Strandh and Eklund 2015:363-
368). 
As mentioned in the previous, the use of the term “terrorism” was not recorded before 1971 
within the Swedish parliamentary publications (Strandh and Eklund 2015:363). Even so, 
Sweden has naturally had a series of events that have triggered discussions regarding national 
security and crisis management. To name but a few: the attack against Norrskenflamman in 
1940, the 1972 Bulltofta aircraft hijacking, the murder of Prime Minister Olof Palme in 1986, 
the killing of Foregin Minister Anna Lind in 2003. After mentioning these domestic events, I 
now turn to international events which may have impacted on the development of terror 
prevention ideas in Sweden.   
The events of “nine-eleven” constitute a significant landmark; which could also be referred to 
as a borderline event (c.f. Rüsen 2005), whereby the rules and conditions for a variety of entities 
became dramatically altered, not least the global political climate. The international pressure 
on the Swedish criminal policy increased, and the words of George W. Bush (cited in Flyghed 
2007:77) “[…] those who are not with us are against us” became an implicit mantra [my 
translation]. In the shadow of 9/11, other events, such as the international attention to Al Qaeda 
(and its offspring Isis), and the U.S-led invasion of Iraq (2003), resulted in an increased focus 
on various international threats. The EU’s role as nexus for fighting terrorism (and its impact 
on Sweden), is exemplified by the introduction of the law Lag om straff för terroristbrott (SFS 
2003:148) (act on penalties for terrorist crimes, my translation) which was introduced in 
connection with the EU’s declaration on combating terrorism (2002). Although this is a law, 
and not a policy, laws affect policies and vice versa. The London bombings in 2005 and the 
Madrid bombings in 2004 brought the perceived threat closer; and in 2007 the Swedish artist 
Lars Vilks published a controversial drawing of the Islamic prophet Muhammad in a Danish 
newspaper, which lead to tensions between various religious and political groups. Then, in 
October 2010 the Swedish Security Service upgraded the threat level of terrorism from “low” 
to “elevated”, and in December the same year, two bombs went off in central Stockholm, which 
brought the threat of terrorism to Swedish soil (Strandh and Eklund 2015:363-367, 372). The 
first explosion took place late afternoon on Olof Palmes gata at the junction of Drottninggatan 
in Stockholm. No one was harmed. The second bomb went off approximately ten minutes later, 
two hundred meters from the previous explosion site. A second bomb then went off but its sole 
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fatality was, however, the perpetrator himself. The bombings were believed to be an attempted 
act of terror (Ranstorp 2011:2). In April 2017 a stolen beer truck was deliberately driven into 
crows along Drottninggatan in central Stockholm. As a result of the attack five people were 
killed, and at least 14 injured. The Swedish Security Service considered the attack an act of 
terrorism, and so did the Swedish media (SVD 9/21/17). Although this attack occurred two 
years after the publication of the latest stagey (2015), the April 8 attack will likely influence the 
development of future policy.  
Based on this brief presentation, I by no means suggest that policy changes are driven solely by 
singular events (c.f Strandh and Eklund 2015:376). Rather, these events are, in my opinion, to 
be understood as important events in light of the political landscape in which they are 
empowered and work as a means of empowerment.  
 
3. Literature review 
 
In this section, I will present a brief contextualisation of the topic of terrorism. A summary 
overview of research conducted so far within the disciplines of criminology and sociology is 
followed by a closer look at four studies, all with relevance to the study at hand. Moreover, the 
present study is placed in context and its contribution argued for. 
Research on the topic of terrorism has been undertaken even before September 11th 2001 
(Laqueur 1977; Wilkinson 1986), though, admittedly, there has been an explosive growth in 
research on the topic since then (Silke 2004:25; Frilich and Lafree 2015). Criminological and 
sociological research on the subject cover topics such as the definition of terrorism (e.g Frost 
2009; Deflem 2004, see even English 2009; Hoffman 2006; Schmid 2004), its causes and 
underlying motivations (e.g Pisoiu 2014; Perry and Hasisi 2014; Bouhana and Wikström 2016; 
Agnew 2010), plausible solutions (Clarke and Newman 2006; Hsu and Apel 2015), and 
problematic features of newly introduced counter-terrorism measures and of the so-called “war 
on terror” (Fekete 2004; Mythen and Walklate 2006; McCulloch and Pickering 2009; Pantazis 
and Pemberton 2009). Despite an increased interest in the study of terrorism, much of the work 
still stems from disciplines other than that of sociology and/or criminology (Freilich and LaFree 
2015:1). Taken together, it seems as if scholarly efforts to answer questions as to what terrorism 
is, and how to prevent it, have been pervasive; whilst there has been less concern with the 
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sociology of knowledge, e.g. how terrorism is spoken and thought of.2 The purpose of my study 
is to address this imbalance by examining how the social problem of counter-terrorism is 
framed. It is of importance to examine the construction of counter-terrorism, as it frames the 
ways in which we think, act and speak about it; whereby it has concrete, “real lived” 
consequences. Hence, the framing of counter-terrorism has effects reaching far beyond the 
realm of language (Loseke 2003:97-121; c.f. Bacchi 2009:17-21).  
In the following, I will present four studies that have inspired my analysis in different ways. 
The first study was an eye-opener to the complex and ever-changing nature of counter terrorism 
policy. The critical research on responses to terrorism in the United Kingdom have enhanced 
my understanding of the possible perils of counter terrorism. Finally, the last two studies 
illustrate how terrorism and counter-terrorism have been studied as discursive constructions. 
 
3.1 The liquid nature of social policy 
 
Counter terrorism policies are political ever-changing documents. Veronica Strandh and Niklas 
Eklund (2014) set out to understand how and why counter terrorism policy has changed since 
2001. The empirical material consists of two Swedish strategies for countering terrorism, 
published between 2001-2014; and annual reports from the Swedish Security Service, 
published between 2001-2013. By looking at the coincidence between focusing events and 
policy changes; as well as changes pertaining to the threat scenario, Strandh and Eklund identify 
a transition from prevention to mitigation. To me it is somewhat unclear how this transition has 
been discerned, and what changes it entails. Of most relevance to me, however, is the final 
review, wherein the authors identify distinct features of the counter terrorism policy trajectory. 
To illustrate these, the conclusion is divided into three parts, each corresponding to different 
time periods. The first period (2001-2009) is characterized by an emphasis on the external 
enemy, Al-Qaeda. Nine eleven, Madrid 2004 and London 2005 are identified as focusing 
events. The second period (2009-2012) represents a significant shift as the threat of terrorism 
is brought to Swedish soil. The attempted terror attack in Stockholm 2010 is to be seen as an 
important focusing event that brought about such a change. The third and final period (2012-
2014) focuses on those traveling back and forth between Syria and Sweden; and it is also 
                                                          
2 Within a Swedish and Nordic context, scholars such as, Magnus Ranstorp, Linus Gustavsson & Peter Hyllengren (2015), 
Magnus Hörnqvist & Janne Flyghed (2012), and Tore Bjorgor (2013), are familiar names. They too have contributed to the 
definitional challenges of terrorism, and how to prevent it. 
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characterized by the institutional transformation, in which government are to collaborate with 
a multitude of social actors; and in doing so, their collaborative role, as well as the need for an 
exchange of information, is accentuated.  
Like me, Veronica Strandh and Niklas Eklund (2014) applies a temporal dimension to 
understand changes in Swedish counter terrorism policy. Although they analyse how changes 
are brought about in light of focusing events, they are less concerned with how terrorism is 
constructed as a social problem. They do, as promised, identify some distinct features of 
different time periods, however, in my opinion, it would behove the study to comprise a more 
elaborated problematisation of these. In present study I intend to include such a 
problematisation.  
 
3.2 Counter-Terrorism in the United Kingdom 
 
As will be shown in section 9, a vast amount of research has been undertaken on the topic of 
terrorism and counter terrorism in the United Kingdom. A pervasive and somewhat 
controversial topic has been how counter terrorism measures impact on Muslim communities 
(c.f Fekete 2004; Pantazi and Pemberton 2009). In comparison with Veronica Strandh and 
Niklas Eklund’s study, a large part of the British research is focused on problematizising the 
responses to terrorism, rather than to describe them. The British literature on responses to 
terrorism has been essential to my understanding of the potential pitfalls of counter-terrorism. 
The British literature will be discussed in depth in section 9 and 9.1, wherein it will be applied 
as a backdrop against which the Swedish material will be contrasted and compared.  
Reading through my selection of critical literature on counter terrorism, I found that there was 
a lack of concern pertaining to social construction of the problem of terrorism. In line with, 
Donileen Loseke (2003) I hold that, in order to make sense of the framework of counter 
terrorism, an understanding of terrorism as a social problem is beneficial, as the design of the 
solutions are contingent upon the construction of the problem. Official texts are not just words 
but contributes to a society’s understanding what terrorism is and how it should be prevented. 
 
3.3 The discursive construction of terrorism as a social problem 
 
An enormous amount of resources is committed to the large-scale project of countering 
terrorism. It is reasonable to presume that this would not be possible without a significant degree 
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of political and social consensus, a consensus achieved through language. In his book, Writing 
on the War on Terrorism – language, politics and counter-terrorism, Richard Jackson (2005) 
examines how the public language of the Bush administration has been deployed in order to 
justify and normalize the global campaign known as the “War on Terrorism”. By using a critical 
discourse analysis approach, Jackson scrutinizes official speeches, statements, texts, symbols, 
laws and policies to shed light on discursive constructions which the political discourse, the 
“War on Terrorism”, rests upon. His point of departure is that the manner in which terrorism is 
spoken of is not merely description of the world but reflects underlying assumptions and power 
relations. An important finding is that identity is discursively constructed, and that idea of the 
good American is constructed in relation to its opposite: the terrorist vs. the alien other. 
Moreover, the discourse is characterised by hybridity (as its draws on other narratives such as 
the “war on drugs” and “red scares”), consistency (the words used are identical and recurrent) 
and opacity (lack of definitions of central terms). And what’s more, the discourse is highly 
gendered. Men are portrayed as potential heroes, whilst women are portrayed as potential 
victims (Jackson 2005:80ff). Important arguments are that the “War on Terrorism” is to be seen 
as a powerful discourse as it has been normalised and institutionalized; and is in that sense also 
dangerous, as it has ruled out and/or marginalised other possible narratives. In his final 
discussion Jackson argues that the “War on Terrorism” endangers democratic values and that 
the greatest danger lies in “ […] that we too become terrorist; and that as we demonise, 
dehumanise and brutalise the enemy ‘other’ it becomes a war of terrorism rather than a war on 
terrorism” (Jackson 2005:183).  
Christopher Baker-Beall (2014) has conducted a similar study, in another context, and with 
slightly different type of material. He explores the discursive construction of the counter 
terrorism discourse, the “fight against terrorism”, within the European Union. The approach 
taken is discourse analysis and the material is mainly that of European Council policy 
documents, but also reports and official speeches of the EU Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator. 
Baker-Beall argues that the analysis of meaning making-processes, reflected through counter-
terrorism policy, is important as “discourses work to limit or constrain what it is possible to say 
about a subject” (Baker-Beall 2014:216); and, as such, discourses may be viewed as a form of 
social practice, in which language plays a performative role. Baker-Beall identifies three 
strands, all of which are central to the discursive construction of the “fight against terrorism” 
discourse. These are the following “ […] terrorism as a criminal act; terrorism as an act 
perpetrated solely by non-state actors; and terrorism as a ‘new’ and ‘evolving’ threat to the EU” 
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(Baker-Beall 2014:231). Through these strands, the discursive construction of the “EU 
identity”, constantly contrasted with the terrorist “other”, is brought to light. An important result 
is that the identity of the EU is not simply shaped in relation to the external “other”, e.g. 
potential threats of terrorism emanating from third countries. It is also shaped in relation to 
constructions of the internal “other”, that is the “enemy within”, for instance the Muslim 
“other”.  
While I find these studies inspiring, I hold that they could have benefited from an analytical 
perspective which offers an understanding of how social problems are constructed, i.e. how 
they are framed. By using Loseke’s (2003) approach to social problems, I hope to contribute an 
understanding of the construction of “successful” social problems, such as that of terrorism. 
 
 
4. Research question 
 
My main research question pertains to an interest in how the social problem of terrorism is 
constructed. This question encompasses three subqueries. In this first one, I look for changes 
over time betwixt the public antiterrorism strategies in Sweden. The second reflects my 
particular interested in counter-terror measures in Sweden. Loseke’s so-called prognostic 
frame is of particular interest in this respect. The third and final question addresses how 
responses to terrorism in Sweden may be understood against the backdrop of British literature 
on counter-terrorism.  
How is the social problem of terrorism constructed in three Swedish strategies (2008, 2012, 
2015)? 
 Is there any temporal difference between the three strategies? 
 What are the primary proposed solutions to terrorism, as expressed in the Swedish strategies?  
 In light of the British literature on Counter-terrorism; how may the preventive outlook in 
Sweden be understood? 
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5. Theoretical framework 
 
In this chapter I start by defining my terms of reference. I reflect upon the reasons why I do not 
prefer to use the term the “new terrorism”, and I explain my understanding and approach to the 
notions of terrorism and extremism. In the other half of the section, I account for the overall 
analytical perspective which has guided the analysis, drawing inspiration from – in particular - 
Donileene R. Loseke (2003) and Carol Bacchi (2009). 
 
5.1 Point of departure: The notions of terrorism and extremism  
 
The endeavour of defining terrorism is by no means a simple one. Some scholars like to make 
a distinction between terrorism and the “new” terrorism, as a new more lethal type of terrorism. 
The term, “new terrorism” although it had been used previously, really came into its own in the 
aftermath of 9/11 and is said to differ from its precursor in the sense that its practitioners pose 
a greater threat as they seek to yield mass causalities by using indiscriminate religiously inspired 
violence (Neumann 2010, c.f. Laqueur 1999). Moreover, the “new” terrorism is said to differ 
from the “old” due to its international scope, organisational structure (decentralized rather than 
centralized) and because of the fact that its justification rests on religious grounds rather than 
political motifs (Prunckun 2014:180; Mythen and Walklate 2006:380; Pantazis and Pemberton 
2009:650; Spencer 2006:1f). Mockaitis (2004:22) stresses that the ethical codes which 
previously restrained terrorists have passed into oblivion. Although it is important to be aware 
of ongoing controversies pertaining to terrorism, the purpose of this study is not to make a 
judgment as to whether terrorism is to be labeled “new” or “old”. As for the study at hand, I 
have chosen to write the “new” terrorism within quotation marks, partly due to the vagueness 
of the term; as it has proven historically difficult to grasp a yardstick that is essential in order 
to ascertain the “newness” of the phenomena. Additionally, the semantics of “old” and “new” 
risk to make a complex phenomenon appear simple; and, along the same lines, I hold that the 
prefix “new” risks to shadow the historical dimension of the notion (c.f. Jackson 2005:58, 185). 
As such, the understanding of terrorism risks becoming a-historic.  
Scholars have not yet agreed upon an unambiguous definition of terrorism; and, as mentioned 
in the literature review section, scholars still struggle with the analytical issues that lies within 
the definitional problem of terrorism (English 2009:viiii; Hoffman 2006:1f; Aas 2013:110f). 
An important outset is, however, that terrorism may, depending on the beholder, include a wide 
range of activities; and, by the same token, the designation of the label terrorist, rests upon 
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moral and subjective judgments (Hoffman 2005:260; Skoczylis 2015:13:ff). “One man's 
freedom fighter is another man's terrorist” is a familiar and illustrative phrase. Thus, the 
definition of terrorism is not just aimed at defining certain groups/individuals and/or activities, 
but tends to reflect the perspectives and/or the interest of those who are in the position of doing 
the defining. Adrienne Sörblom & Magnus Wennerhag (2016) stress that extremism, like 
terrorism, is a highly subjective notion. It is is based on normative conceptualizations of reality, 
and as such, changes over time (c.f Lööw 2017:21-37). Extremism has, generally, been 
associated with democratically undesirable ideals, whilst terrorism has been used to describe 
violent methods chosen by extremists to induce fear and uncertainty in order to promote some 
greater political agenda (thus, the former is usually considered to precede the latter; one may 
hold views which may be considered extremist without resorting to enacting said views in a 
violent fashion). A conflation of the two has, however, become prevalent as of late, and they 
are – in several instances - used in an inconsistent and uncritical way, within the public debate 
as well as within the scholarly community (ibid.15; Backes 2010:178f). 
With this said, I do not argue that extremism or terrorism ought not be an objects for scientific 
analyses. Nor do I mean to imply that the usage of these notions has to result in a seemingly 
endless discussion pertaining to definitional issues. On the contrary, I hold that these notions 
ought to be used with critical awareness and caution. Nonetheless, it is of importance to 
acknowledge the complexities of the notions of terrorism and extremism, and therefore I will 
therefore apply a critical mindset towards these notions throughout my analysis. However, the 
notions will not function as tools aimed at describing or labeling entities; rather the way in 
which they are used will be the subject of the analysis to come (c.f. Sörblom & Wennerhag 
2016). 
 
5.2 Theoretical approach  
 
The sociological study of social problems through a social constructivist lens dates back to the 
1970’s.3 Within this tradition, Malcolm Spector’s and John Kitsuse’s piece Constructing Social 
Problems (1987) and “Social problems as collective behavior” by Herbert Blumer (1971) 
represent important contributions. Donileen R. Loseke (2003) sites herself within this tradition, 
in which social problems are examined as constructions rather than as objective conditions. She 
                                                          
3 Although scholars have studied social problems from the vantage point of social constructivism prior to the 1970’s, 
Constructing Social Problems (1987) is an important book, often credited with forming an intellectually coherent approach 
for the study of social problems within sociology. 
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holds that social problems ought to be understood as constructed by way of the human activity 
of social problems work, where defining some conditions as troublesome ones, which ought to 
be dealt with, is of the essence. A fundamental point of departure is that different constructions 
of social problems affect the ways in which humans create meaning of the world (including 
their own position in the society/world). Hence, the goal of claim-makers, that is those who 
construct the social problem (e.g. politicians or the mass media) is to persuade the audience 
members (those who are to be convinced) that their claims about a certain condition, are 
believable and important. To this end, a “package of claims” which, together form a narrative 
(“social problem formula story”) about a special condition, labeled a social problem, are 
delivered.4 Disparate claims may compete, and to claim-makers, it is of importance to persuade 
the audience that their specific set of claims is more believable and important than are other 
sets. There is a hierarchy of credibility among claim-makers and those at the top of the 
hierarchy, e.g. scientists, possess distinct advantages in persuading the audience (Loseke 
2003:88-99). In this respect, Loseke (2003:20) uses the metaphor of a game in order to highlight 
the power dimension at play5. If one is successful and “wins” the social problems game, one’s 
narrative (social problem formula story) may turned into common knowledge, what Loseke 
(2003:93) refers to as “popular wisdom”, i.e. knowledge that is taken for granted.  
To begin with, to qualify for the social problems game, claim-makers have to construct the 
grounds of the problem, that is the “facts” of the condition (e.g. what harm does it inflict and 
who is harmed). Herein the parameters of the condition are set. When the “facts” of the 
condition is defined, claim-makers ascribe them meaning. According to Loseke (2003) meaning 
is primarily created through three social frames, the diagnostic, the motivational, and the 
prognostic frame. These frames will be central to my analysis, as I am interested in the meaning 
making processes that underpins the framing of the social problem of terror prevention. In the 
following, I aim to elaborate further on these. 
Within the diagnostic frame (Loseke 2003:59-63), the meaning and causes of the troublesome 
condition is presented. A social problem may, depending on the diagnostic frame, be constituted 
                                                          
4 Naturally, each and every person, most likely, would not accept all claims about a certain condition. Audiences consist of 
heterogeneous populations and, consequently, some claims will be evaluated as believable and important by some, whilst 
rejected by others. Moreover, audience members ought not to be understood as passive recipients, as they are 
continuously evaluating and reevaluating proposed claims (Loseke 2003:27f).  
5 Loseke’s game metaphor of social problems game should not be dismissed as a simple game played just for “fun”, with 
one everlasting loser or winner. Instead, the social problems game is deadly serious one, as its outcomes shape our world; 
and recall that social life in ongoing and complex - hence, wins and losses are never eternal, but they may be partial and/or 
temporary. Despite this complexity of win and losses within the social problems game, they – nonetheless – are of great 
importance as influence our daily lives (Loseke 2003: 20f).   
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as (1) a problem caused by a certain societal condition, e.g. the social welfare system, and/or 
(2) caused by social forces, e.g. racism. So, too, causes (3) may be constructed as residing within 
an individual, e.g. due to his/her weak character. Different explanations of causes also raise 
questions regarding blame and responsibility. One common feature of diagnostic frames, is that 
they tend to bring about simplifications, as claim-makers apprehended simplicity as effective 
in making claims. Such simplifications most certainly ignore the complexity of real life.  
Additionally, there are two ways in which claim-makers link “newly” constructed problems to 
already existing ones. The first strategy, referred to as piggybacking, is about linking one social 
problem to another well-known, already established problem, by constituting the “new” 
problem as a different instance of the aforesaid. The other strategy, known as domain 
expansion, has to do with how claim-makers expand the realm of an already acknowledged 
social problem, in order for it to comprise new conditions. These are often effective as they 
make a “newly” constructed problem seem less strange, and thereby familiarity is constructed. 
As such, claim-makers may evoke associations to “old” social problems that have already 
obtained a certain degree of acceptance.  
As for the motivational frame (Loseke 2003:76-96), questions as to “Why should we bother?” 
are answered. Two methods of persuasion are illustrated. The first alludes to what appears to 
be logical reasoning. Audience members have ideas about the ways the world ought to work. 
These ideas are part of a wider social context (historically and culturally specific), and could 
thus be understood as cultural themes. That which violates these themes are perceived as 
disturbing and, hence, important. For instance, a new condition considered to offend the same 
cultural themes as an earlier condition, often gains attention (c.f. piggybacking). Furthermore, 
as cultural worries may be hard to address directly, claim-makers may make so-called symbolic 
claims, which are about far more than they appear to be at first glance. Such claims are symbolic 
in that they reflect larger more diffuse cultural worries. To put it simply, claims that appeal to 
audience member’s understanding of cultural themes, usually are successful ones.  
However, given the complexity and heterogeneity of today’s society, there will always be a 
lack of agreement as to diverse cultural themes. Hence, appeals to logical reasoning might not 
be sufficient; and the other method, which seeks to motivate the audience through emotional 
appeals may be needed. Appeals to emotions are beneficial to claim-makers, as emotions 
impinge upon the way we think and vice versa. For example, people usually take conditions 
seriously if they fear them. Humanitarian themes, that has to do with people’s capacity to care 
about others, may evoke certain feelings, such as sympathy towards the victims. This, in turn, 
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may motivate the audience to evaluate the condition as a social problem. “Darker feelings”, 
such as revenge, anger and hatred may, in the same fashion, encourage the audience to deem a 
certain condition intolerable. Although it is possible to experience something as being very 
personal, each cultural setting has its own rules of feeling, that is conventions surrounding how 
people “ought” to feel in a particular situation. If claim-makers appeal to said rules, they may 
be successful in stirring emotions that motivate audience members to feel and think about a 
certain condition in a particular way, namely as a social problem.  
Lastly, the prognostic frame (Loseke 2003:97-117), tackles the query “What should be done?”. 
Within this frame, measures aim to resolve the harm as identified, plus those who should 
preferably carry out the actions are identified. These claims are of great important as they, by 
assigning some people the responsibility for changing the condition, as well as legitimizing 
some solutions (and not others), set limits upon what is possible to think, write or speak about 
a certain condition. For instance, the ways in which the solutions to terror prevention are 
constructed, set the limiting framework for how it is possible to speak of and think of the 
phenomenon. Furthermore, solutions raise issues of ethics, e.g. one proposed solution may be 
perceived as beneficial to one group, but may well be harmful to another. This understanding 
of solutions is important, as it recognizes the real lived consequences that proposed solutions 
may lead to, not least in the case of policy.   
The prognostic frame highlights in what ways each frame, i.e. the diagnostic motivational and 
prognostic are interlinked. Let me give an example. If terrorism is described as a social problem, 
emanating from, e.g. conflicts and war (diagnostic frame), then the individual may be perceived 
as the victim of war toward whom feelings of pity may be directed (motivational frame). Hence, 
possible solutions will most likely revolve around structural changes, in which the government 
probably will be assigned the overall responsibility (prognostic frame). On the other hand, if 
terrorism is constructed as a problem generated by individuals, e.g. because of his/her beliefs 
or psychic problems (diagnostic frame) these individuals will, most likely, be evaluated as 
blameworthy villains, dangerous or pathological outsiders, rather than victims in need of 
sympathy (motivational frame). Suggested solutions will, probably, focus on changing and 
rehabilitating (if considered possible) the individual and protect the rest of society from him or 
her (prognostic frame). In light of this, it becomes evident that social problem formulae stories 
are moral in their nature; as they consist of value judgments as to what is wrong and why this 
is the case. In this respect, the prognostic frame comprises claims as to changes, in other words; 
15 
 
what ought to be done to correct this wrong. One significant way in which claim-makes may 
carry out social changes is through public policy.  
The very existence of policy documents rests upon the presumption that policies constitute 
something useful. They are aimed at resolving or fixing conditions, usually referred to as social 
problems. That which is evaluated to be wrong is usually said to affect a significant number of 
people, but may, and even ought to be, changed and corrected. Such a change is not only 
achievable but desirable (pronounced through language). Consequently, the idea of change is 
embedded within social problems. As such, social problems do not merely affect our 
understanding of the world but also, the way in which they are framed, bring about changes to 
the social world. For this reason, scrutinizing the ways in which problems are shaped in public 
policy is of the essence, as the ideas presented in public policy are translated into lived, real 
experiences. They affect a plethora of dimensions in people’s lives (Loseke 2003:97-121; c.f. 
Bacchi 2009:17-21).  
Although I have chosen to deploy Loseke’s perspective in the study of policy documents, there 
are endless different approaches to the study of terrorism. Murat Harner (2017), for instance, 
interview a former PKK terrorist, at the time of the study situated in a Turkish prison, about the 
“life of a terrorist”. To speak with people who has been part of a terrorist organization about 
their experiences of terrorism may hence be one way to gain unique insights into why some 
people possibly are draw to terrorism. Additionally, through the method of interviews, one may 
also study various narratives of terrorism.  
 
 
5.2.1 Crime prevention  
 
Apart from Loseke’s perspective, this study also makes use of Sahlin’s thoughts on crime 
prevention. I will foremost draw on Sahlin’s perspective in the prognostic frame as it is within 
this frame that different preventive ideas are most prominent.  
The term crime prevention has, in itself, positive connotations, as it is seen as something new 
and proactive, aimed at restraining a potentially negative future development. Crime preventive 
ideas are therefore seldom subjected to criticism or ethical audit. Ingrid Sahlin (2000), however, 
critically examines the notion of crime prevention. She distances herself from the beliefs that 
crime prevention represents something new and necessarily positive, and that crime prevention 
16 
 
measures are always rational. Instead she holds that crime prevention and choices of preventive 
models are political in nature. Although preventive ideas continuously co-exist in society, one 
set of ideas may be dominant at a given time, in a specific historical and cultural context. Hence, 
contemporary political discourses influence what measures are, at any given time, perceived as 
preventive. Moreover, preventive choices, do not merely affect the preventive work in practice, 
but also the ways in which the problem, and even human nature, may be understood.  
I will be applying an overarching division between social and situational crime prevention. This 
division is the most commonly used since the 1990s, and is usually motivated on the basis of 
epistemological premises pertaining to human nature (Sahlin 2000:86-87, 100ff). As for the 
social prevention the object is to alter structures or processes (external factors) which are 
assumed to predispose the individual to criminality. Crime is, hence, believed to primarily take 
place due to external, environmental factors, and it is not assumed to be an intrinsic part of 
human nature to commit crime (c.f. Merton 1968). The point of departure of the situational 
crime prevention is that people will commit crime if they are presented with the opportunity 
(Sahlin 2000:87f). The situational prevention hence, takes aim at manipulating the immediate 
physical environment in order to reduce the opportunities for crime. Situational crime 
prevention ideas may draw inspirations from theories such as Rational choice (Clarke and 
Cornish 1985), Broken Windows (Wilson and Kelling 1982) and Routine activity theory 
(Felson ad Cohen 1979). Pat O’malley (1992:263) observes a trend, in which situational 
prevention triumphs over the social, especially in the Anglophone countries (c.f. Sahlin 
2000:106f; Sarnecki 2009:479). Sweden has, however, historically, emphasized solutions to 
crime that bears resemblance to the social crime prevention; although, social prevention does 
not constitute a uniform set of ideas but, rather, offers a plethora of possible paths/orientations. 
One orientation may, for instance, emphasize changes to structures, another socialization, and 
a third “early interventions”. In order to describe and compare different preventive ideas, I draw 
inspiration from criteria formulated by Sahlin (2000:84-89). My taxonomy builds on the 
following criteria: time frame (long or short-term), object of change (e.g the individual or social 
fabric), the superior value (e.g. the promotion of individual’s development or society’s safety) 
and the intervention phase of the preventive measures (primary, secondary or tertiary 
prevention).  
Primary prevention is initiated to avoid a future negative development, secondary prevention 
seeks to change people, typically those at high risk of embarking on a criminal path and tertiary 
prevention is directed toward known offenders, to prevent re-offending. The prevention phases 
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are not solely differentiated based on their temporal distance to the predicted out-break of the 
problem, but also in relation to their magnitude (size of target group). Although Sahlin did not 
consider the topic of terrorism directly, I intend to use her analytical framework on crime 
prevention; as I view ccounter-terrorism measures and their legitimacy to be underpinned by 
ideas as to crime prevention.  
 
5.2.2 A constructionist perspective on social problems  
 
In the present study, social problems are not viewed as fixed, objective entities, which reflect a 
reality of truth. Rather, social problems are to be understood as dynamic social constructions, 
contingent upon historical and cultural conditions (Loseke 2003:4ff; Bacchi 2009:viiii, c.f. 
Spector and Kitsuse 1987). With this said, I by no means suggest that social problems or 
troublesome conditions do not exist; nor do I mean to diminish human experiences of, e.g. fear 
and suffering. I hold that a social constructivist perspective may be viewed as but one way to 
make sense of the world. Moreover, the perspective ought to be seen as a complement, an 
important addition (rather than an exclusionary opposite), to other theoretical approaches which 
aim to offer an understanding of social problems (c.f. Loseke 2003:x). Naturally, choices of 
theoretical framing also entail different possibilities and limitations, as to which questions that 
may, or may not be posed. If I were to evaluate the effectiveness of a certain policy, a more 
materialist, e.g. an evidence-based approach, may have made more sense. However, as my 
primary interest lies in examining the construction of social problems, i.e. how they are framed 
(“problem-questioning”, rather than “problem-solving”), I find a social constructivist approach 
suitable (c.f. Bacchi 2009:xvii).  
As explained in the previous, I do not reject the existence of the material world containing 
troublesome conditions (a criticism frequently directed to social constructivism). The perils of 
being far too relativistist and contextless also lies herein. In this respect, two questions seem 
reasonable to pose: Which understanding of social problems may be achieved if they are to be 
understood as isolated from the surrounding world? And how may scholars advocate for the 
relevance of the study of a certain problem construction? With that being said, however, I do 
not mean to imply that each troublesome condition in the world is equivalent to one social 
problem; rather objective conditions may exist without subjective worry and vice versa. What’s 
more, an objective condition is not a social problem till it is given meaning and defined as such 
(Loseke 2003:13ff; Bacchi 2009:31f).  
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6. Method 
 
To begin with, I will present my initial thoughts, I will then explain the choice/collection of 
data, after which I reflect upon its limitations. I thereafter account for the ways in which the 
material has been analyzed.  
Initially, my first ambition regarding this study could be said to have been three folded as I: (1) 
intended to do a comparison between national strategies in Sweden and the UK, (2) a 
comparison between local counter-terrorism strategies in Sweden and the UK, and (3) a 
comparison between the local and national level in each country. I was, however, for various 
reasons, unable to fulfill these ambitions. Firstly, only one of the British strategies were 
designed in a similar manner as the Swedish, hence I found that a comparison, due to the 
different content of the strategies, would have been insufficient. To use British literature on 
counter-terrorism as a backdrop to make sense of the Swedish strategies appeared the better 
option. A second obstacle I encountered had to do with the lack of strategies for countering 
extremism or terrorism on the local level in the UK. I tried to circumvent this by conducting 
interviews with police officers working against terrorism at a local level. However, this too 
failed, as the police officers I came in contact with ceased to answer me after having first said 
that they would be glad to assist me. In Sweden I, however, came in contact with two chiefs of 
security of two municipalities, and a professional working on the national level, together with 
the national coordinator to safeguard democracy against violent extremism (Nationell 
Samordnare mot våldsbejakande extremism). All three of them approved being interviewed. 
After this turbulent “start-up” phase, I decided to stick with the three national Swedish strategies 
for countering terrorism, plus a selection of British academic literature on counter-terrorism, 
and to conduct the three interviews.  
 
My main material, that is the three national Swedish strategies published 2008, 2012 and 2015, 
was downloaded from the Swedish government’s official webpage. Since my ambition is to 
examine how terrorism is constructed as a social problem, the three aforementioned strategies 
are of vast interest, as they could be viewed as significant platforms wherein the shaping of the 
social problem takes place. They may also be apprehended as representing discourses of status 
(c.f Bacchi 2009:36); as they are sanctioned by the Swedish government, and as such, they 
possess the prerogative in formulating the nation’s official outset pertaining to terrorism. Hence, 
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the three Swedish strategies, play an important role in both crafting and reinforcing the social 
conceptualization of the phenomenon of terrorism in Sweden. 
Policy documents usually refer to its predecessors. This could, for instance, be seen in the 
strategy from 2011. As the strategy from 2008 does not refer to any previous work, I have come 
to the conclusion that this presumably is the first Swedish national strategy for countering 
terrorism. Policy documents are official documents aimed at guiding practical actors. Policy 
documents provide recommendations, while laws are standards and procedures that must be 
followed.  
The British academic literature (secondary data) was found through library searches, and online 
searches via the university’s online resources, e.g. the British Journal of Criminology. I wanted 
to find critical studies on the UK’s responses to terrorism, wherefore I used the keywords 
“terrorism, “counter-terrorism”, “the UK”, and “problem”. I also tried to do searches with the 
keyword “war on terror”, which generated a very extensive result. As several studies were of 
the US “war on terrorism”, I only used the key-word “war on terror” once or twice. I used two 
important criterions in my selection of British academic literature on counter-terrorism: (1) As 
the Swedish strategies were published after 9/11, I found that it was suitable to include British 
studies published post 9/11 (with two exceptions, Garland 1996 and O’Malley 1992). (2) The 
major part of the research included address counter-terrorism in the UK in a direct manner. I 
particularly searched for studies that deal with counter-terrorism in a critical manner, by looking 
at the effects of policies, laws and counter-terrorism measures. As the larger part of the research 
included analyses of policies, laws and counter-terrorism measures – on a theoretical basis; 
studies that deal with peoples’ experiences of the these through, e.g. interviews, have been left 
out. Moreover, as I wanted to understand the preventive outlook in Sweden in relation to 
developments in the UK, I found that research that touched upon the problem of counter-
terrorism, in a slightly more indirect manner, also ought to be included. This research includes 
studies which illuminate a broader preventive development (risk and security) within the UK.  
As for the interviews conducted with professionals, I used a purposive sampling technique, and 
the fact that the interviewees - at different levels - worked with countering terrorism and 
extremism, was used as the basis of the selection. Although, my sample is too small to be 
representative; I hoped that the two chiefs of security from the two Swedish municipalities 
would give voice to a local perspective on countering extremism, whilst the professional 
working with the national coordinator to safeguard democracy against violent extremism, 
would provide a national one. The interviews were conducted in the café of a library, as I 
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believed that this would be a setting in which the in interviewees would feel relaxed. The 
interviews were semi-structured, and the questions revolved around counter-terrorism and 
extremism. Some of the questions directly addressed what they thought of collaborative 
arrangements employed to countering terrorism. Before the interviews began I informed all 
interviewees that their participation was completely voluntary, and that they are guaranteed 
anonymity; hence all names and geographical places are figured (Hammersley & Atkinson 
2007:212ff). Likewise, I made clear that all data collected would be handled with 
confidentiality during the study, as well as after its publication. I judge these ethical principles 
to be necessary in order to protect the participation (Hennik, Hutter and Bailey 2011:70f). Two 
out of three interviews were recorded on tape (one interviewee did not want to be recorded as 
he claimed to have had bad experiences of being recoded). I was, due to the lack of time, unable 
to fully transcribe the recoded interviews. Because of this I have not made use of the 
interviewees in an extensive manner.  
As Jackson (2005:24) argues, the social practice of language and the production of text may 
never be undertaken objectively. This is the point of departure for discourse analysis. The study 
at hand bears a clear affinity with discourse analysis, as it seeks to examine how meaning is 
created, and it is also inspired by the theoretical tradition of social constructionism. Despite 
these resemblances, my study differs from, for instance a. critical discourse analysis in the sense 
that it is less linguistically orientated. Its main goal is not to critically inspect how language 
serves to maintain power relations; but rather, to investigate claims that construct a social 
problem. Moreover, I hold that the study of social problems is a specific task. Whilst a discourse 
could be almost anything spoken, written or preformed or, even a photograph, social problems 
represent conditions thought of as widespread and changeable. Death, for instance, could very 
well be thought of as a discourse but is usually not defined as a social problem (Loseke 2003:6). 
I stress that my study may be viewed as a form of qualitative text analysis (see Hennik, Hutter 
and Bailey 2011:238) somewhat inspired by elements from discourse analysis, but it is 
however, above all, guided by Loseke’s (2003) perspective on social problems. In section to 
follow we will take a look at how my main material has been processed.  
The strategies have been analyzed in a systematic manner with Loseke’s perspective on social 
problems kept in mind. Carol Bacchi’s (2009) analytical tools (key-concepts and binaries) have 
also influenced the interpretation of the material. The work has consisted of four, closely 
interlinked, cycles.  
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In the first cycle, I carefully read through the strategies in order to develop a detailed description 
of the problem reflected in the material. As I gradually became familiar with the strategies, I 
was able to develop an understanding of the problem, and to place the problem in context (c.f. 
Hennik, Hutter and Bailey 2011:238-243). Hence, the practical work within this cycle, 
consisted of reading the strategies from cover to cover, writing summaries and reading literature 
of relevance. Additionally, I had telephone contact with Anna Carlstedt, the national 
coordinator to safeguard democracy against violent extremism, and Lars Korsell, committee 
secretary at the National Centrum for Countering Terrorism, to gain a profound insight in the 
problem of terrorism. The development of a descriptive understanding of the problem may be 
equated with Loseke’s first step, namely to look at “facts” and thereby identify how the 
parameters of terrorism are constructed. Looking at “facts” involves looking at how key-
concepts are defined (although such activity has been present at all times). Key-concepts are 
words that are vital to the understanding of the social problem. These concepts, e.g. terrorism, 
are usually open-ended, contestable, and are hence, typically difficult to define (Bachhi 2009:8).  
In the second cycle, I started to search for patterns (c.f. Hennik, Hutter and Bailey 2011:243-
245). By comparing the strategies, I was able to identify patterns and to further explore the 
problem of counter-terrorism. The practical element consisted of reading through the strategies 
over and over again in depth. As I began to discern patterns, contrasting the three strategies 
against one another helped me to identify the process of meaning making. When comparing the 
strategies, I found that several aspects were present in all strategies, however, the difference 
between them lies in which feature (or features) that is emphasized in the given strategy. I 
studied how meaning is created by looking at, what the causes to terrorism are said to be, and 
by looking at the construction of familiarity. I was primarily, via Loseke’s analytical tool of 
“piggybacking”, able to develop an understanding of how terrorism by “riding on the back” of 
other, already established problems, is constructed as a familiar problem.  
In the third cycle, I kept reading trough the strategies, over and over. In my deep-reading of the 
strategies, I tried to think of in what ways terrorism is presented as an important and intolerable 
condition. By categorizing different ways to write of terrorism, and the actual threat of it, the 
occurrence of appeals to emotions and logic became more prominent. For instance, I gained 
insights as to how the threat of terrorism is depicted as escalating. Drawing on Loseke (2003:75-
88), I was cognizant of how feelings influence thoughts and how certain emotions, in 
accordance with feeling rules, direct people’s thoughts toward victims or villains. The third 
22 
 
cycle is closely interlinked to the next, as it was within these cycles that the major part of the 
analytical process took place.  
In the fourth cycle, I continued the categorization on the basis of Loseke’s perspective. By 
grouping categories together, I was able to discern what categories belonged to the proposed 
solutions (prognostic frame), and how these are related to other categories, e.g. the causes 
(diagnostic frame). By conceptualizing the categories, deploying Loseke’s analytical thoughts 
on the prognostic frame, I began to develop an understanding of how the solutions are 
constructed, who is assigned the responsibility of “fixing” the problem and how proposed 
solutions differ in-between the strategies. The British literature on counter-terrorism, and the 
three interviews served to further improve my understanding of the prognostic frame. When my 
categorical procedure was elaborated further, binaries reflecting power relations and/or 
identities became salient. I could for instance make out how the identity of “us” is constructed, 
both in relation to the external and internal other. As I have identified patterns, categorized the 
content of each strategy and made compassions in-between them, the “bigger picture”, that is 
the over-all construction of terrorism as a social problem, became clear.  
 
The analysis has consisted of an ever ongoing process of interpretation, and re-interpretation. 
Although it has been rare, I have sometimes been afraid that I, e.g. due to a vagueness of a 
formulation, have unconsciously attempted to make my interpretations fit within the theoretical 
framework. When this occurred I took a break from reading the strategies, and when I returned 
to them, I approached them with a fresh mindset. Another difficulty I encountered, has to do 
with the translation from Swedish to English. As always when translating from one language 
to another, one never achieves a verbatim translation. Some phrases from the strategies were 
difficult to translate, and I perceived the Swedish terms “driv- och dragkrafter” particularly 
challenging. I translated them into push and pull. The notion of push and pull is, however, 
normally associated with migratory and development studies, and within these fields they both 
serve to illustrate forces or processes external to the individual. I would say that the Swedish 
term “drivkrafter” is slightly more individualistically orientated; hence the translation into 
“push and pull factors” is, in my opinion, a somewhat unsatisfactory.  
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6.1 Reflexivity 
 
I could not claim to have a vivid memories of the deeds of September 11th 2001. However, I 
remember part taking in a minute of silence in my school the following morning. I also have a 
vague memory of seeing the planes crash into the World Trade Center on TV. At that time, I 
did not reflect further upon the topic of terrorism as I was at mere child at the age of nine. Since 
then and especially during the last decade it is hard to avoid thinking about terrorism. The 
attacks in Madrid 2004, London 2005, Paris 2015 and Sweden 2017 have all influenced the 
overall intellectual climate in the West. I have just as many people around the globe felt fear, 
especially this past year. The history of the “troubles” were constantly present during my stay 
as an exchange student in Belfast this spring. Additionally, the attack outside the houses of 
parliament occurred whilst I was in Belfast; and the very day I flew home, the first attack in 
Stockholm took place. Same year, I visited London and Rome. The security measures in the 
public spaces in these countries, e.g. the Carabinieri in Italy, constantly reminded me of the 
potential threat of a terror attack. I would thus say that the potential threat of terror has been a 
fairly constant presence.  
My fears are not only because of the various attacks in and of themselves, but also towards the 
reactions to the aforesaid. This essay could be seen as my attempt to examine the public 
discourse that may – in subtle and indirect manner – underpin my fears.  
 
 
7. Analysis 
 
My analysis is divided into four sections: Grounds, Diagnostic frame, Motivational frame and 
Prognostic frame. The first section deals with the definition of terrorism; namely, how the 
parameters of the condition are constructed. The second section attempts to answer questions 
as to what kind of problem terrorism is constructed as; more specifically, I examine how harm 
is specified and what the causes of the condition are said to be. In the third, I attempt to explore 
how appeals to logic and emotion frame terrorism as intolerable and hence, counter-terrorism 
as important. In the fourth and final section, I critically scrutinize proposed solutions and, 
what’s more, what preventive ideas that underpin these solutions.  
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Naturally, a social problem may have multiple diagnostic, motivational and prognostic frames, 
and depending on choice of perspective, different elements will be given attention. Loseke’s 
theoretical framework thus offers but one of many possible understandings of social problems. 
Her approach enables me not only to spot certain aspects of social problems, but it also 
constrains my understanding of other ones. Hence, the analysis to come is not exhaustive; as 
that which is brought to light only represent one, of many possible selections.  
 
7.1 Grounds 
 
In this section, I analyze how the “facts” of terrorism are constructed and, consequently, what 
type of problem terrorism is framed as. The lion’s share of what I have analyzed in this section 
is aggregated from the introductory part of the respective strategies; as I view that these parts 
answers questions as to: what is the condition, what harm does the condition cause and how 
many people are harmed.  
In the strategy from 2008, the direct terrorist threat to Sweden and Swedish interests is described 
as relatively low, two troublesome conditions are, however, presented. Firstly, there is the well-
known, less severe threat posed by domestic separatists, anarchist and far-left groupings. These 
groups aim to inflict damage upon that which symbolizes governmental power; such as, the 
police, the military and government buildings. However, since the 1990s, a new severe threat 
from religious Islamic extremism has emerged. Mass violence, destruction and suicide attacks 
are all part of the modus operandi used, and the goal sought after is often diffuse. Hence, 
innocent civilians are at risk (Skr. 2007/8:3). Based on these “facts”, the informed reader may 
freely “fill in the blanks” (c.f. Loseke 2003:56) about the changed nature of the threat, which 
theoretically resembles, or even perfectly matches ideas about the “new” and the “old” terrorism 
(c.f. Prunckun 2014:178f). In policy document, the “old” terrorism is given less attention in 
favor of a “new” terrorism. According to the new definition of terrorism, it has become 
international, more severe and, to a greater extend, started to target civilians. In the strategy 
harm is defined as the physical damage which causes injuries or fatalities (Skr. 2007/8:3). 
Although there is a lack of statistics on the number of attacks and/or victims over the past years, 
the terror attacks in USA 2011, London 2005 and Madrid 2004 are mentioned (Skr. 2007/8:5-
6).  
As for the strategy from 2012, “executed and interrupted attack plans have shown both that 
there is a real risk of terrorist attacks in Sweden, or against Swedish interests” (2011/12:3, my 
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translation].6 The strategy beings by introducing the attempted terror attack in Stockholm 
December 11th 2010, and the deeds of the Norwegian terrorist Anders Behring Breivik in 2011. 
These events illustrate a new tactic in which individuals prepare and commit violent acts alone, 
without ties to any command-structure, and without any material assistance (the so- called 
“lone-wolf” terrorism) (Skr. 2011/12:5-6). These new tactics/methods belongs to the “new” 
terrorism (drawing inspiration from Al-Qaeda), with which we made acquaintance in the 
strategy from 2008. Another issue briefly touched upon, is that of people traveling to conflict-
zones from Sweden, in order to train and partake in armed conflict (Skr. 2011/12:6).  
Although two other types of terrorism are presented, far left and far right wing terrorism; the 
international terrorism, i.e. the “new” terrorism stemming from Islamic extremism, is still 
deemed the greatest threat, as its adherents aim to achieve a large number of civilian causalities 
(Skr. 2011/12:5). Again, the “new” international terrorism is, in comparison with the “older” 
forms of terrorism, given greater space. Furthermore, this type of terrorism is not solely 
perceived as a threat towards people’s lives, properties, the functionality of society, but also 
against “our fundamental values” (Skr. 2011/12:4). Hence, the “new” terrorism is more 
complex, as its nature has changed to comprise new tactics; and what’s more, harm is no longer 
defined as primarily physical, but also symbolic.  
In the hitherto latest, strategy from 2015, there is, unlike in the previous strategies, no clear-cut 
statement making inferences as to the threat towards Sweden or against Swedish interests. 
However, a number of attacks and interrupted attack plans are mentioned. Amongst other, the 
attack in France (Paris) 2015, Denmark (Copenhagen) 2015, Tunisia (Sousse) 2015; and the 
interrupted attack plans in Denmark 2010 and Paris 2015 (2014/15:3). In cases where the 
terrorists’ plans were implemented, the total number of victims is indicated. It is noteworthy 
that in this instance, statistics are given as a means of specifying the harm done. Statistics may 
be used in order to construct the notion that a problematic condition is widespread (Loseke 
2003:6f).  
In the first paragraph, it is stated that: “terrorism is not a new phenomenon. Violent acts from 
non-state or non-parliamentary groups have long been used to destabilize societies, create 
social disorder and fear, with the overall purpose of harming institutions, groups and 
individuals, to influence the development of society and democratic decisions” (Skr. 
2014/15:3). From this, one may conclude that states or parliamentary based organizations is not 
                                                          
6 This, as well as all quotes to come have been translated from Swedish by me.  
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to be considered terrorists. Although the same three types of terrorism as in the strategy of 2011 
are presented, the major threat is deemed to come from actors inspired by Al-Quaeda and Isis. 
Likewise, the incidence of “home grown terrorists”, so-called “lone wolfs” remains seriously 
problematic (Skr. 2014/15:4). The issue regarding those individuals who travel from Sweden 
to “conflict-zones”, where they participate in “terrorism training” and thereafter return, is 
brought to attention (Skr. 2014/15:4). As opposed to the previous strategy of 2012, the 
vocabulary has evolved, and those who travel back and forth from these zones are termed 
“returners” (Skr. 2014/15:4, 31). Hence, the parameters of international terrorism have 
changed; it is now constructed as comprising two problematic conditions “lone wolfs” and 
“returners”. As in the strategy of 2012, international terrorism may not only harm people’s 
physical well-being, but the overall state of human rights and fundamental democratic values 
as well (Skr. 2014/15:3).  
From this brief presentation, I have shown that the way in which harm is specified changes, as 
does the parameters of the condition. Consequently, that which may be thought of as “objective 
facts” of a condition is not fixed. This understanding of “facts” is important to keep in mind, as 
“facts” constitute the basis from which meaning is created. Now, let us take a closer look at 
how meaning is shaped through the diagnostic frame.  
 
7.2 Diagnostic frame: Constructing causes - Blame and responsibility 
 
In the original strategy from 2008, the casus of the troublesome condition emanates, primarily, 
from “weak fragile and/or underdeveloped states” (Skr. 2007/8:18-19), that lack functioning 
democratic institutions, e.g. an independent juridical system, due to internal conflicts and 
structural issues such as poverty (Skr. 2007/8:15-16, 18-19). By constructing causality as due 
to social structures, individuals may be seen as victims and, as such, they may - to some extent 
- be spared from blame. As that which needs to be corrected is found on a structural level, 
responsibility is, most likely, directed towards the state (c.f Loseke 2003:60). However, it is 
important to bear in mind that, to a certain degree be relieved from blame ought not to be 
equated with being completely absolved from it. The same applies to responsibility. Hence, in 
this case, when that which causes the troublesome condition are located outside the national 
realm (Skr. 2007/8:17-18), the problem of terrorism is likely to be thought of as a social problem 
exterior to Sweden, and other “developed states”. 
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Although constructed as rare, there do exist individuals residing in Sweden (foremost youths) 
which are “seduced” into terrorism (the word seduced implies passivity) (Skr. 2007/8:15). In 
Sweden, the causes too are located at the structural level. Social forces such as discrimination, 
segregation and exclusion, are seen as causes of terrorism (Skr. 2007/8:14). Once again, 
individuals may be relived from blame, as the responsibility is directed towards the broader 
society and state.  
Both explanations have in common that individuals are protected from blame but there is one 
important difference. In the first instance, that is, when the causes are located outside Sweden 
(the EU and if one wishes the West), the labeling of some states as “weak” serve to prove the 
inferiority of these states. Here, dividing practices are at hand, as two binary categories, 
“underdeveloped” and “developed” countries, are constructed; and on a micro-level, 
individuals from certain alleged countries may typified as “other”, and/or even dangerous (c.f 
Bacchi 2009:16). 
Furthermore, in 2008’s strategy, terrorism is understood as a criminal act (c.f. Baker-Beall 
2014:220). This relationship between terrorism and crime is reinforced by direct statements in 
the strategy claiming that terrorism ought to be considered a crime (Skr. 2007/8:7-9). Terrorism 
is, additionally, intermeshed with organized crime as it is seen as a similar type of activity that 
requires similar responses (Skr. 2007/8:4). Terrorism is, alongside other modern threats, such 
as natural disasters, viewed as a branch of globalization and, in a similar fashion, the so-called 
“new” terrorism is constructed as a different facet of the “old” terrorism. In all of these cases, 
terrorism has been piggybacked onto claims about “old terrorism”, crime and globalization. As 
such, terrorism feeds on the achieved level of acceptance of already established problems and; 
by the same token, it appears somewhat familiar without risking audience saturation (boring 
the audience). Herein, meaning is created via the construction of familiarity (c.f. Loseke 
2003:60f). Moreover, if the “old” terrorism, as written about in the strategy, was somewhat 
narrow, in the sense it mainly included terrorism in Sweden (see Skr. 2007/8:3), claims about 
the “new” terrorism certainly allows for the expansion of its scope, and thereby also for the 
embodiment of new conditions, in this case international elements (see Skr. 2007/8:4). This 
categorical augmentation could be understood in terms of domain expansion (c.f. Loseke 
2003:61) but in this case I would suggest that it is more about a change of focus. To me, domain 
expansion is underway when new contents are added to a condition already deemed a social 
problem and thereby expands its scope. But in this instance, the inclusion of a domestic 
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dimension functions not to expand the condition but, rather, to overshadow an international 
dimension. I will return to this topic.  
In the updated strategy from 2012, the causes are still thought of as emanating from so-called 
“particularly vulnerable regions” (Skr. 2011/12:14]. These causes are, however, emphasized to 
a lesser degree. Instead, focus of the strategy is on hindering radicalization in Sweden, 
expressed through the idea of “lone wolfs” (Skr. 2011/12:5, 9-10). Although there is a lack of 
definition, the concept radicalization certainly puts more focus on individuals residing in 
Sweden. As illustrated in the following quote one aim is to ”support individuals in order to help 
them avoid being drawn into violent extremism” (Skr. 2011/12:10). Hence, individuals are not 
apprehended as having deliberately chosen to become terrorists. As such, they may be freed 
from a lot of blame, and the overall responsibility to – in this instance support individuals – lies 
with the society. Although, social forces such as racism, including antisemitism and 
islamophobia are still mentioned (Skr. 2011/12:13) (though given less space), the reason as to 
why (some) people become radicalized remains elusive.  
In the strategy, that of 2015, counteracting radicalization the overarching goal. Although, the 
meaning of radicalization is not specified, radicalization is an important key-concept (c.f. 
Bacchi 2009:16) as it is said to cause terrorism (so too in the strategy of 2012). By way of 
radicalization, individuals may be “pushed to commit acts of violence” (Skr. 2014/15:4). In this 
quote, individuals are still not seen as actively choosing to become terrorists. But there is a lack 
of consistency as to whether one is drawn into terrorism (Skr. 2014/15:4), if one ”choses to join 
terrorist groups” (Skr. 2014/15:12); and even, if one actually “choses to commit terror offences” 
(Skr. 2014/15:12). Such an inconsistency complicates the allocation of blame.  
Furthermore, radicalization is said to depend on different risk factors, termed “push and pull” 7 
(Skr. 2014/15:5, 6, 9). The push and pull factors are centered around the individual; his or her 
personality, life situation (push factors) or social context, e.g. relation to friends (pull factors) 
(Skr. 2014/15:5). So, the strategy also offers an explanation as to why some people are 
radicalized whilst others are not. Through the perspective of push and pull (especially the 
former), a reallocation of blame becomes possible as some individuals may be perceived as 
“having a weak character”, e.g. thrill seekers (c.f. Katz 1988), or having weak interpersonal 
relationships (c.f. Hirshi 1969). None of the causes presented focus on structural flaws and/or 
                                                          
7 As already mentioned the Swedish terms “driv- och dragningskrafter” were a bit complicated to translate into 
English. The terms push and pull emphasizes conditions external to the individual to a larger degree than do 
the Swedish terms “driv- och dragkrafter”.  
29 
 
social inequalities, e.g. discrimination; and the perspective of “push and pull”, together with 
terms “lone wolfs” and “returners” (Skr. 2014/15:4) pave the way for an understanding in which 
the causes are, to a greater extent, constructed as found inside the individual or in his immediate 
context (c.f. Loseke 2003:60).  
In this passage, I have looked at how meaning is created by examining how causes are 
constructed and, consequently, how blame and responsibility is apportioned. Taken together, 
the ways in which the causes are constructed in the policies marks a shift toward: (1) locating 
the causes within rather than outside Sweden and; (2) to and an increasing extent disconnecting 
the causes from conditions exterior to the individual and, in doing so, redirecting them towards 
the individual.  
It is also notable that, when the causes are constructed as exterior to individuals residing in 
Sweden, these are never constructed as due to shortcomings of the state’s capacity (as in the 
case of “underdeveloped states”), e.g. an insufficient welfare-system. To give the audience a 
sense of what the “new” terrorism is about may not be sufficient to claim-makers, as they seek 
to change society (or parts thereof). Claim-makers need to persuade the audience that the 
condition is not to be tolerated or; put differently, claim-makers depend upon the audience to 
evaluate the condition as intolerable (and consequently important). In the following, I shall put 
forwards some of the ways in which this is done by appeals to logic and emotions.  
 
7.3 Motivational frame: Appeals to logic and emotions 
 
In the first half of this section, I aim to account for the most salient appeals to logic and 
emotions, identified in the strategies. These are chosen on the basis of their recurrence and their 
relevance to the construction of terrorism as an intolerable and important condition. In the other 
half of the section, I look at how images of people, in this case, victims and villains, are 
constructed in relation to the overall emotional atmosphere of the strategies. This passage could 
have been part of the diagnostic frame but I hold that it better suited here, as victims and villains 
are not merely constructed in relation to blame and responsibility. Rather, they are constructed 
in a wider emotional context.  
Terrorism is presented as a social problem that threatens to violate the social order and our 
understanding of how the world ought to work. Generally, cultural themes are contingent upon 
cultural and historical contexts; thus, a condition regarded to threaten and/or to violate a specific 
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cultural theme in one setting, may be considered perfectly benign in another (Loseke 2003:63f). 
This is, however, hardly the case when it comes to terrorism.  
The most explicit endangered cultural theme present in all the strategies (but most prominent 
in the 2008 strategy), is our right to a free and peaceful life (Skr. 2007/08:20, Skr. 2011/12:9, 
Skr. 2014/15:24). The “right to life” is regulated in article 3 in the UN’s Universal Deceleration 
of Human Rights (UN 1948). However, the idea that all human beings have the right to live a 
free and peaceful life without being harmed, could be said to be a worldwide cultural theme. 
The ways in which people think about a condition is connected to the way they feel about it 
(Loseke 2003:77). If the cultural theme “right to life” is perceived as threatened, feelings of 
fear of actual physical harm are, naturally, evoked. In the following I will mention three 
distinguishing features of the strategies that may enhance fear. The first (1) feature has to do 
with the belief that anyone anywhere at any time, may be a victim of terrorism, as the terrorist’s 
modus operandi of the terrorists yields victims indiscriminately (Skr. 2007/8:3, Skr. 2011/12:4-
5, Skr. 2014/15:3) (Loseke 2003:80f; c.f. Best 1999). This notion is inherent in the “new” 
terrorism, and may be reinforced by the fact that no particular target group is discerned in the 
strategies. Additionally, (2) terrorism is framed as condition hard to get rid of, and this may 
trigger fear. The durability of the threat is expressed through the following quotes: “the threat 
of terrorism will remain for a long time to come” (Skr. 2007/8:4) and “ today, there are no signs 
that this trend will decline” (2014/15:1). Lastly, (3) the framing of the threat of terrorism as 
exacerbated between 2008 and 2011 may add to already existing fears. Feeling of fear may, of 
course, also have been augmented by the violent events that took place in the passing years.  
Moreover, the threat scenario is, as illustrated in the following quotes, escalated between 2008 
and 2011: “the direct terrorist threat to Sweden and Swedish interest is relatively low” (Skr. 
2007/8:5) and “there is a real risk of terror attacks in Sweden or against Swedish interest“ 
(2011/12:3). In the strategy published in 2015, there is no explicit description of the threat 
scenario, however, terrorism is said to “threaten international peace and security, international 
security and our fundamental rights” (2015/11:1). One logical conclusion is that a condition 
that threatens both international and national peace and security, is presumably, quite severe. 
In fact, even associations to war may be called to mind, since what else than war may imperil 
both international and national security? In brief, the fear of psychical harm is escalated along 
with the threat scenario. Such a framing of the problem of terrorism, most likely, induces fear 
(c.f. Culture of fear, Furedi 2002); and that which we fear, we will usually take seriously, as we 
deem it to be of importance.   
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Although emphasis is on the physical threat, another threat, more salient in the two later 
strategies, has been identified; namely the threat towards the cultural theme of democracy (c.f 
Loseke 2003:66ff). This threat is expressed in slightly differing ways, however, this is usually 
made with references to “human rights, our fundamental rights” and/or “our values” (Skr. 
2011/12:4; Skr. 2014/15:1). If democracy is portrayed as threatened, an audience that wishes to 
live in a democratic country is encouraged to care on logical grounds. No conceivable definition 
of democracy is offered. In Sweden, however, as well as in the rest of the West, ideals 
emanating from the age of Enlightenment and the French revolution have informed the general 
understanding of democracy. However, these ideals do not represent one, but rather a number 
of ideas (thought of as democratic rights); as such it could be argued that which constitute 
democracy may be a plurality of values and, hence contested. Although, freedom of speech 
(Skr. 2007/8:17; Skr. 2014/15:10) and the right to demonstrate (Skr. 2011/12:12) is mentioned 
in the respective strategies, there is still a certain degree of opacity as to exactly what democratic 
rights are endangered. The phrase “our values” is similarly opaque, but it may also evoke 
associations to George W. Bush’s rhetoric (Jackson 2005:54) on the “War on Terror”, in which 
liberal Western values are said to be threatened by Islam (c.f. “Clash of Civilizations”, 
Huntington 1996). In this respect, “our values” may be apprehended as a symbolic claim 
(Loseke 2003:67), as it addresses fears often perceived difficult to approach in a direct manner.  
In sum, terrorism is undoubtedly, via appeals to logic, presented as threatening to various 
cultural themes, such as that of democracy, which the Swedish audience – in all likelihood - 
will hold dear. Additionally, appeals to emotions, e.g. fear, are present, although fear is not 
merely evoked toward the psychical threat, but, rather, towards something “bigger” that is 
ascribed symbolic value. Taken together, these appeals to logic and emotions may enhance 
perceptions of terrorism as intolerable and, hence an important condition.  
 
7.3.1 Victims and Villains  
 
In the strategy of 2008, terrorism is spoken of in the same breath as other, all too familiar, 
dangerous phenomena (referred to as crises), e.g. natural disasters and global epidemics, which 
may be perceived to lie beyond the confines of the state’s control (Skr. 2007/8:20). This may 
induce fear, however, fear is neither the only, nor the most salient emotion. One may, for 
instance. Take the following quote: ”we are effected by what is happening in the rest of the 
world, and we cannot afford to stand by and watch, whilst others act” (Skr. 2007/8:5), as an 
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appeal to people’s desire to help others, and to make the world a better place (c.f global village, 
Harvey 1990). The task of assisting “weak states” (Skr. 2007/8:18) may similarly be read as an 
appeal to people’s capacity to care about others. These appeals could consequently be perceived 
as calls to solidarity, but they may just as well be viewed as having the added objective of 
gaining popular support for military intervention. Anyhow; appeals to humanitarian themes (c.f. 
Loseke 2003:77) motivates the audience to care as the problem of terrorism is framed as 
intolerable, important and changeable. And as noted by Loseke (2003:78), such feelings, e.g. 
compassion and solidarity, tend to follow certain feeling rules, which brings the victim to the 
fore. Constructing victims, as opposed to villains, may be strategically clever as it may be hard 
to construct persuasive claims about villains, due to the complexity of social problems (c.f. 
Loseke 2003:85).  
 
In the updated version from 2012, the humanitarian theme is present, but it is - to a great extent 
- eclipsed by other emotions. As ideas of the “lone wolf” (Skr. 2011/12: 5-6) brings the threat 
closer to Sweden, fear is generated. In addition, the Swedish armed forces are said to be in a 
needed state of rearmament (Skr 2011/12:18). This may expand feelings of fear as associations 
to conventional warfare may be made. Appeals to “darker feelings” such as fear may, due to 
feeling rules, be associated with hatred and blame, and hence draw attention to the villain 
(Loseke 2003:83). In strategy of 2012 blame, however, is deflected from the individual as s/he, 
by way of radicalization, is “drawn into violent extremism” [p, 10]. Radicalization is, thus, 
constructed as something which, to a large extent, is to be found outside the individual. This 
makes the individual less frightening. Parallels may be drawn to alcoholism constructed as a 
disease (c.f. Loseke 2003:86).  
In the final strategy from 2015, feelings similar to those found in the strategy of 2012 are 
present. Through the ideas of “lone wolfs” and “returners” (Skr. 2014/15:4, 19, 15), fear 
dominates the emotional atmosphere. Again, focus is on the villain. Due to the inconsistency 
regarding the causes of terrorism (mentioned in the diagnostic frame), two types of emotional 
reactions pertaining to the villain, are possible. As in the previous strategy, blame may still be 
deflected from the villain and thus, portray him/her as less frightening. On the other hand, an 
explanation of terrorism, inspired by the perspective of “push and pull” (Skr. 2014/15:5,6, 9, 
11-12), may possibly contribute to an arousal of fears toward specific individuals. As I have 
read between the lines, I have found that the villain is constructed as a young man (see Skr. 
2014/15: 4,9-10,11,33). However, this image of the villain may seem too obscure; hence, in 
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order to make sense of the world, people may turn to typification. In doing so there is, indeed, 
a risk that certain individuals are identified as dangerous outsiders (c.f. Loseke 2003:85) and, 
at this point, the step towards stereotyping is not far off. In today’s political climate, and due to 
the US and UK influence on the conceptualization of terrorism, Muslims may conceivably be 
pigeonholed as dangerous (c.f. “suspicious community”, Hillyard 1993).  
As demonstrated, the overall emotional atmosphere shifts betwixt the strategies. In the first 
published strategy, the overall mood is characterized by the humanitarian theme, whilst appeals 
to “darker” feelings are more pervasive in the latter two. As the emotional atmosphere shifts, 
so too does the focus – from the victim to the villain. The villain may, from the perspective of 
“push and pull” be despised, e.g. due to his or her weak character; and perhaps, even by some, 
perceived as dangerous (particularly in the later strategy). Yet, the Swedish construction of the 
villain differs from that in other contexts, e.g. an American context. The villain, as constructed 
in the strategies, is not portrayed as evil and vicious; nor are words such as “innocent victims”, 
“hidden, crazy, evil and deadly enemy” (Jackson 2005:160, 168) used. In the American context, 
these words serve to justify and separate the struggles between what is framed as good and evil. 
Due to the absence of such rhetoric, I would argue that the Swedish construction of the villain 
contains fewer dehumanizing elements than does the American (c.f. Jackson 2005:185).  
In the path so far traveled, I have examined how the parameters of terrorism are constructed. I 
have also shone light on how the social problem of terrorism is ascribed meaning. In the most 
recent section, I have demonstrated how appeals to logics and emotions encourage us to care, 
and in doing so, to evaluate terrorism intolerable, and hence counter-terrorism as important. 
These claims are part of a problems formula story about terrorism, and together, they set the 
stage for what is next to come, namely the prognostic frame.  
 
7.4 Prognostic frame: Constructing solutions 
 
In this final section, my ambition is to scrutinize how solutions to terrorism are constructed. 
The solutions reflect ideas concerning what actions ought to be implemented to counter 
terrorism and who should carry out these actions.  
In the strategy from 2008, that which causes terrorism is, to a great extent, located outside 
Sweden (diagnostic frame) (Skr. 2007/8:18-19, 21). So too are the solutions. Sweden’s 
engagement in “underdeveloped countries”, and so-called “conflict-zones” is thus pushed for 
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as the security of Sweden is framed as dependent on the security and stability of other – usually 
referred to as “fragile” states (Skr. 2007/8:18-19) (c.f. Duffield 2007:29, 162, 170ff). Moreover, 
these “fragile” states are perceived as unable to solve ongoing internal conflicts, and hence also 
to combat terrorism (the silence as to the origins of these conflicts is noteworthy, e.g. the US-
led invasion of Iraq in 2003) (Skr. 2007/8:19f). Consequently, some states are framed as being 
in need of help, whilst others are designated the task of helping. This binary construction 
involves a power dimension.  
As demonstrated in the following quote: “questions regarding national security can no longer 
be differentiated from international security” (Skr. 2007/8:5), Sweden’s national security is now 
viewed to transcend its sovereign territory. There is, doubtlessly, a blurring of national and 
international security. In this regard, there may be competing claims pertaining to the 
consequence of the solutions proposed (c.f Loseke 2003:99). Scholars such as McCulloch and 
Pickering (2009:631f) have warned against such dangerous rhetoric, as it may function to 
justify, in this case, Sweden and other “developed states’” military interventions in the affairs 
of other states. Remembrance associated with colonialism may be conjured up, however, 
potential interventions would not, in such a case, be in the guise of civilizing or developling, 
but rather, in the guise of countering terrorism. Additionally, Aas (2013:108) argues that the 
blurring of national and international security is problematic, as it may challenge the distinction 
between crime and war. 
International cooperation is seen as a prerequisite for successful terror prevention (c.f “the war 
on drugs” Aas 2013:130f). Sweden alone may therefore not resolve the problem of terrorism, 
but is dependent upon international collaboration with other states and transnational 
organizations, e.g. the EU and UN. One interpretation of this is that the state’s role as the 
ultimate protector of citizen’s security and rights, which has been its trademark since its 
formation, is weakened (c.f. Zender 2009:26-49). Another interpretation is that transnational 
collaboration lends Sweden the opportunity to position itself in the global arena by way of 
identifying with, for instance, the UN and/or the EU (particularly the latter). Sweden’s affinity 
with the EU is illustrated in the strategy: “that which happens to our European neighbors may 
happen here too” (Skr. 2007/8:5) and “the major attacks in European countries in recent years 
– especially the ones in Madrid and London – have brought terrorism closer to our country in 
both time and space” (Skr. 2007/8:5). Through this time-space compression, social space 
extends beyond the boundaries of physical space; and through it, the construction of “us” and 
“them” is unveiled. “We” ought to protect ourselves from “them”, in this case non-EU citizens. 
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If the aforementioned citizens are considered a threat to the EUs internal security, they may be 
denied entrance (Skr. 2007/8:21) (c.f. “Fortress Europe”, Loader 2002). Consequently, the 
solution of border controls builds on the binary construction of “us” and “them”; once again, 
dividing practices are in play.  
On the national level, authorities are encouraged to collaborate to counter terrorism (Skr. 
2007/8:3, 7-9, 12). The Swedish Security Service (SÄPO) is, however, assumed to have the 
main responsibility of fighting terrorism (Skr. 2007/8:3). Although the mission of SÄPO, as 
well as the regular police force, includes several repressive elements, its non-repressive tools 
are emphasized. SÄPO’s main terror preventing task is to be present, to make contact with 
citizens and to initiate dialogues with them about democracy and terrorism (Skr. 2007/8:16). In 
this context, the Swedish Prime Minister's dialogue with Muslim representatives in Sweden, in 
connection to the Lars Vilk drawing, “Rondellhunden“ (published in 2007), is given as an 
example of a constructive dialogue. This dialogue is said to have contributed to an increased 
mutual understanding between religious and ethnic groups (Skr. 2007/8:16). Discussions and 
dialogues are hence put forward as plausible solutions to the problem of terrorism.  
Here, a direct connection between the prognostic and diagnostic frames becomes visible; since 
dialogues and discussions would not be conceivable solutions, if there is not also an 
understanding of terrorism as caused by some sort of conflict. Alongside discussions and 
dialogues, long-term changes to what is referred to as the structural level are underlined. This 
is exemplified in the following quotes: “the majority of the preventive work today is aimed at 
structural factors” (Skr. 2007/8: 16), “the government’s goal is to fight segregation, 
discrimination and exclusion” (Skr. 2007/8:15)“, and “to create equal living conditions” (Skr. 
2007/8:15). These ideas belong to a social crime prevention perspective, in which general 
efforts (primary prevention), rather than selective ones are sought after (c.f. Sahlin 2000: 32-
35). However, no suggestions are made as to improvements of social institutions (the term 
welfare system is nowhere to be found in the strategy); its focus is instead on encouraging 
citizen participation (Skr. 2007/8:15), and to make the citizen reflect upon implications of 
democracy. These measures are believed to integrate individuals and, hence, promote a positive 
development.  
Based on this, I would suggest that the social prevention emphasizes socialization, rather than 
changes to the social fabric (c.f. Sahlin 2000:89-97). Furthermore, as often the case when it 
comes to this type of prevention, general preventive efforts - at times with a special focus on 
youths - is advocated for (Skr. 2007/8:16,18) (c.f. Sahlin 2000:36, 96f). At the same time as 
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individual development is promoted, the individual is also assumed to internalize healthy social 
norms, and as a consequence of this, be steered away from the lure of crime. Based on this, a 
logic conclusion is that it is not in human nature to commit acts of terror, but rather, that people 
are radicalized, primarily, due to external factors, e.g. environmental ones (c.f. Sahlin 
2000:89ff, c.f. Hörnqvist and Flyghed 2012:319). Despite these social measures, repressive 
elements may be part of the solution. These consist of temporary laws (whose duration are to 
be evaluated) which permits secret coercive measures, e.g. bugging. These measures are less 
emphasized and when discussed, possible tensions between society’s safety and individual 
liberties are explicitly mentioned. Amongst these, civil liberties are framed as an important 
value (Skr. 2007/8:7). 
In the strategy from 2012, focus is on the idea of “lone wolfs” and the threat from “within”. 
This threat is constituted by Swedes, or people residing in Sweden that are radicalized 
(diagnostic frame) (Skr. 2011/12:5-6, 9, 12, 15). Sanctions, such as freezing of assets, which 
since the treaty of Lisbon (that entered into force in December 2009), are now possible even 
against EU-citizens (not states) (Skr. 2011/12:25). Despite the idea of free movement within 
Schengen, Sweden introduced controls at the Swedish border (albeit only for one day). These 
controls were implemented with reference to there being a serious threat to the public order 
(Skr. 2011/12: 20). These new “possibilities” signify a new trend, in which preventive measures 
also may affect those residing in Sweden and/or the EU. The omnipresent idea of “lone wolfs” 
not only brings forth such a change but it also brings the domestic realm to the fore.  
On the national level, increased financial means are given to SÄPO and the regular Swedish 
police. To initiate dialogues and discussion, as well as to promote democratic values amongst, 
particularly, youngsters, is seen as important parts of SÄPO’s and the regularly police 
preventive work (Skr. 2011/12:910). These preventive elements, in which socialization is a 
central feature, resembles those of 2008s strategy. However, other types of preventive ideas are 
present as SÄPO is also assigned the task of hindering radicalization by spotting “individuals 
who, in action, have begun a process towards supporting or partaking in any form of violent 
extremism“ (Skr. 2011/12 :9). When identifying these individuals, the freedom of speech ought 
to be cherished; and for that reason, it is stressed as important that focus ought not be on the 
arguments and ideas that underpin a certain action (Skr. 2011/12:9). A significant difference 
between a prevention that revolved around socialization, and this type of preventive ideas, is 
the increased focus on certain individuals. Control measures are aimed at a selective part of the 
population; youths who have already displayed their deviance trough committing criminal acts 
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(c.f. Broken Windows, Wilson and Kelling 1982), and those youths considered to be likely to 
become deviant (Skr. 2011/12:11-12) (c.f. secondary and tertiary prevention, Sahlin 2000:36ff). 
As general efforts are replaced by more selective ones, a shift from socialization to control is 
illuminated; and along these lines, a positive development of the individual, is – to a greater 
extent – subordinated to the safety of society (c.f. Sahlin 2000:106f). Although the terminology 
is being developed further in the next strategy, part of the preventive ideas current in the strategy 
of 2012 bring to mind, that which Sahlin (2000:42ff) refers to as “early interventions”.  
To attain control of individuals a continuous collection of information, achieved through 
collaboration, is necessary (Skr. 2011/12:10, 12, 15, 18-19). 8 Collaboration solely between 
authorities is no longer sufficient. Other social agencies, and even individuals are encouraged 
to partake in the preventive work in order to “affect their own life situation and society at large” 
(Skr. 2011/12:13). As demonstrated in the following: “the general public may contribute to 
authorities’ work with detecting and preventing attacks” (Skr. 2011/12:26) and “the 
government, thus, stresses the need of further developing the possibilities of the general public 
to get in touch with law enforcement agencies in order to contribute to the detection of, for 
instance, preparatory terror activities” (Skr. 2011/12:26-27). The general public is hence 
expected to provide information to authorities, although it remains unclear in the strategy 
exactly what kind of information is to be passed on. Individuals are encouraged to take 
responsibility, not only for their own safety but for others. This way of reorganizing the 
preventive work could to be related to David Garland’s idea of “responsibilisation” (1996); in 
which non-state agencies, with references to collaboration, are encouraged to partake in the 
endeavor of crime prevention (in this case terror prevention).  
Furthermore, solutions containing repressive elements do exist. The temporary secret coercive 
laws, mentioned in the previous strategy, are (although they are still temporary) perceived as 
necessary to an effective terror prevention (Skr. 2011/12: 21). And it is stated that SÄPO 
sometime is in need of assistance from the national task force of Sweden (Nationella 
insatsstyrkan, NI). NI is the ultimate police resource of society, said to deal with serious, and/or 
exceptional situations (Skr. 2011/12:17). Moreover, it is also stressed that the police, under 
certain circumstances, may request support from the Swedish military (Skr. 2011/12:18-19). In 
this, a risk to cloud the division between the police and the military becomes prominent. A 
blurring of the police and the military is ethically problematic as, the military is not to be used 
                                                          
8 A search on the term “Information” in the strategy gives 68 results, and a search on “collaboration” 
(samverkan) gives 58 hits.  
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in a repressive way against its own citizens according to democratic traditions (c.f. McCulloch 
and Pickering 2009:637).  
Assistance from NI and the military, as well as the introduction of border controls, represent 
measures which ought only to be used under certain serious circumstances; and, as such, they 
could be termed “exceptional measures”. Calls for the need of such measures, nonetheless raises 
a myriad ethical questions, e.g. the danger of normalizing exceptional measures (especially if 
their duration are extended beyond the moment of crisis) (c.f. Zender 2009:123-126).    
The idea of “lone-wolf”, that is the threat from “within”, casts suspicion on Swedish citizens 
and those residing in Sweden, and may, thus, endanger the notion of “us” and “them”. To assure 
the picture of “us” as good democrats the term “our fundamental values” (referring to 
democratic values) (Skr. 2011/12:3) and expressions with the same spirit, are recurrent in the 
strategy (Skr. 2011/12:4,7, 16). The absence of such expressions in the strategy of 2008 is 
noteworthy.  It could, perhaps, be stressed that the idea about the threat from “within” is double-
sided, as it on the one hand challenges the binary division of “us” and “them” and on the other 
hand serves to clarify the picture of “us”. This is done not only in relation to an external “other” 
but also in relation to an internal “other” (c.f. Baker-Beall 2014:232).  
I wish to make a final note on the strategy of 2012. Although there are undoubtedly significant 
differences between the strategy of 2008 and 2012, some of the suggested solutions in the later 
are similar to those present in the former. For instance, aiding “particularly vulnerable regions” 
(Skr. 2011/12:14), dialogues and discussions (Skr. 2011/12:9, 15) and fighting social injustices, 
such as discrimination (Skr. 2011/12:13), are still seen as important part of the preventive work. 
Similarly, protecting the EU: s border, and to check “third country citizens” (Skr. 2011/12:20) 
remains an important concern. 
The strategy of 2015 is, characterized by the vocabulary of risks, which may be understood in 
light of the inconsistency (possibly leading to uncertainty) reflected in the diagnostic frame. 
Thwarting radicalization is still perceived as the ultimate goal to counter terrorism (Skr. 
2014/15:1, 5, 8-9, 12-13). As such focus remains on the domestic realm; and the major task of 
preventive work is to “as early as possible identify processes of radicalization, in order to stop 
individuals and groups from becoming further radicalized and ultimately commit acts of terror” 
(Skr. 2014/15:5). The safety of society is stressed as the superior value. To identify “risk-zone” 
individuals that already pose, or in the future may come to pose a threat to the social order is 
thus, deemed a necessity (Skr. 2014/15:9-10). Those at risk are to be identified at an early stage 
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in order to counteract a perceived likely, or possible, future negative development (Skr. 
2014/15:9-12, 20). To preempt threats before they emerge involves a pre-crime logic, in which 
“better safe than sorry” is the motto. Although such a motto may seem logic (especially when 
it comes to preventing devastating acts of terror), it nonetheless may endanger the presumption 
of innocence. Thereby there is also a risk to erode the rule of law (c.f. McCulloch and Pickering 
2009:632f).  
As presented in the strategy, to look for different “push and pull” factors may be viewed as a 
way to identify those perceived to be at risk of becoming, future so called “Lone-Wolfs”. A 
part of the “push factors” focus on individual motivations, such as a search for meaning and 
excitement (Skr. 2014/15:5). From this it becomes clear that some individuals are considered 
especially prone to radicalization. As in the strategy of 2012, those who have already proven 
their deviance (by being convicted of crime) and those perceived likely to, in the future, become 
deviant are apprehended to be particularly prone to further deviance, such as that of 
radicalization (Skr. 2014/15:11, 13-14, 21). There is, however, a lack of explicit explanations 
as to what causes this proneness. Based on the idea of “push” factors, one may, for instance, 
speculate that said proneness is to do with internal “push” factors manifested due to the “weak” 
character of the individual. On the other hand, one may also speculate that the proneness to 
radicalization is caused by some sort of disease. There is, without doubt, an uncertainty 
pertaining to the meaning of “push” factors and, so too how these may function to identify 
individuals at risk. Despite this, selective measures aimed at “risk-zone” individuals are 
promoted. A clear-cut explanation of what actions will be implemented at those at “risk” is 
missing. It is, however, stressed that different measures are to be implemented for different 
individuals (Skr. 2014/15:12). Question as to the transparency of the law may come to mind. 
The pull factors have to do with the individual’s social context. If s/he moves in a social context 
that promotes, e.g. ideological violence, the likelihood of radicalization increases (Skr. 
2014/15:5). “Risk-zone” individuals may thus be discerned based on the social context in which 
they operate, i.e. who they associate with. Although no social context is identified (which might 
not be disable either); it is, however, mentioned that the breeding ground for “anti-democratic” 
behaviors and violent extremism could, amongst other things, be found within religious 
communities and amongst youths (Skr. 2014/15:10). As always when it comes to an 
identification of so-called “potential risk groups” (2014/15:12), there may be a risk of 
stigmatizing certain groups, or even individuals associated with alleged groups (c.f. Guilt by 
assosication, Pantazi and Pemberton 2009:652).  
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Christina Pantazi and Simon Pemberton (2009) have, in a British counter-terrorism context, 
highlighted the construction of Muslims as the “enemy within” (c.f Fekete 2004). In Pantazi 
and Pemberton’s study the stigmatization of a Muslim population may function as a mean to 
preserve the status quo. In another other case, stigmatization may be an unanticipated and 
unwanted consequence of morally substantiated attempts to change people. The term 
“antidemocratic behavior” (Skr. 2014/15:10) is constructed as the binary to a “honorable” way 
of living” (Skr. 2014/15:23) and through this binary construction a moral division between 
desirable and undesirable behaviors/lifestyles is revealed (c.f. Loseke 2003:90). Although an 
“antidemocratic behavior” is undesirable, people are nonetheless believed to be changeable, 
and hence correctable. All in all, the “push and pull” factors operate on the individual level, and 
they are vaguely defined. Like in the previous strategy, the prevention of “early initiatives” 
focuses on a selective secondary prevention (c.f. Sahlin 2000:36).  
Those individuals who have traveled to and subsequently returned from “conflict-zones” are 
seen to be at risk. These, so-called “returnees” are suspected to have trained for and taken part 
in armed combat (Skr. 2014/15: 4, 31). “Returners” may thus be subjected to both secondary 
and tertiary prevention (c.f. Sahlin 2000:36-38). Another population which may be exposed to 
tertiary prevention is that of convicts (2014/15:13, 14, 21). The formal object of the Swedish 
prison is partly to rehabilitate its clients. This object is reflected in its Swedish name 
“Kriminalvården” freely translated into “The Unit For the Care of Criminals”(their official 
English name: The Swedish Prison and Probation Service). The prison staff is, in the strategy 
of 2015, encourage to search for “sign of radicalization” (Skr. 2014/15:13-14); and when 
reading this, I came to think of the potentiality of there being an unspoken tension between the 
pursuit for control, and the goal of rehabilitation. 
SÄPO is still assigned the overall responsibility for the terror preventive work. SÄPO’s role as 
an intelligence service is emphasized (Skr. 2014/15:14, 16, 18, 21, 23-24, 41), and there is a 
silence as to SÄPO’s ability to initiate discussions and dialogues. SÄPO’s main preventive task 
is thus to collect information about those residing in Sweden, and to detect and analyze “risk-
zone” individuals (Skr. 2014/15:9-10, 23-24). The increased focus on identifying individuals at 
risks seemingly have led to an omission of SÄPOS “softer” assets. To work against social forces 
such as discrimination is no longer mentioned as possible solutions. The temporary secret 
cohesive measures mentioned in the previous strategies, have now become permanent, as they, 
on the behalf of SÄPO, are viewed as needed (Skr. 2014/15:16). Although it is said that 
“personal integrity should be protected when the cohesive measures are used” (Skr. 2014/15:17) 
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the normalization of special powers, as in this case, ought to be recognized as problematic (c.f. 
Zender 2009:123f). 
Like SÄPO, the regular police role as an intelligence service is accentuated. Problem-oriented 
policing shall be the modus operandi of the regular police and; accordingly, the police shall 
collect and analyze data based on local problem scenarios (Skr. 2014/15:12). Sahlin (2000:97f) 
stresses that the transition to a problem-oriented policing is another expression of the pursuit 
for control via collection information. Ericson and Haggerty (1997:17f) have also made remarks 
on said transition. They hold that (1997:18) “[i]n risk society the traditional police focus on 
deviance, control and order is displaced in favor of focus on risk, surveillance and security”.  
Furthermore, to “counteract radicalization and to affect people’s will to commit crime” (Skr. 
2014/15:9) is stressed as an important part of the preventive work. One may wonder what 
solution that – within a democratic society – may be suggested in order to affect the will of 
people? The police primary task is, after all, to protect democratic values and norms, not to 
define them (c.f. Sahlin 2000:136). SÄPO’s mission to prevent terrorism is, by no means, easy. 
It is surely not facilitated by the fact that there, in all strategies, is a lack of both the definition 
of that which causes terrorism (radicalization) and the phenomena itself. 
Collaboration is apprehended as a prerequisite for a successful work (Skr. 2014/15:3, 6, 10-12, 
15, 24-25, 41).9 On page 42, below the heading “collaboration a common responsibility”, it is 
stated that “all who might have a role to play must take their responsibility and contribute 
whichever way they can”. “The whole society” (Skr. 2014/15:6), including non-governmental 
actors and individuals, must partake in the preventive work. As such, they are no longer merely 
encouraged to partake (Skr. 2014/15: 5-6, 32, 42). An exchange of information between 
international national and local authorities (e.g. municipalities), other social agencies (e.g. 
religious communities) and even individuals, it apprehended as necessary in order to achieve a 
desirable control of individuals; but also to streamline the efficacy of institutions. The need of 
information is further expressed through the following quote: “access to information is a 
prerequisite for authorities’ possibilities to avert acts of terror” (Skr. 2014/15:15).10 In 2014 a 
national coordinator to safeguard democracy against violent extremism (Nationell Samordnare 
mot Våldbejakande Extremism) was appointed in order to improve the collaboration, including 
                                                          
9 A search on term collaboration ”samverkan” gives 71 results in the strategy of 2015.  
10 A search on the term information “information” in the strategy of 2015 gives 86 results. 
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the exchange of information, between national authorities and local municipalities and 
organization (Skr. 2014/15:9-10).  
The fact that even social actors whose main mission does not address countering terrorism must 
take part in the preventive work raises several, in the strategy, unspoken complications. The 
Swedish migration agency (Migrationsverket), that is to consider applications from people who 
want to live in Sweden and also to help people who seeks shelter and asylum, is assigned the 
task of helping SÄPO identify, what is referred to as “security threats” (Skr. 2014/15:21). 
People who seek asylum in Sweden, from for instance Syria, may be understood as either a 
potential threat to national security or a human in need. If the perspective in which people 
primarily are seen as a potential threat to national security is accentuated, there is a risk that the 
human rights of people in dire need of help and shelter are neglected. Another conundrum 
concerns the possibility that the people who arrive to Sweden may have been pursued by the 
security service of their respective native countries. Therefore, SÄPO’s involvement in the 
affairs of other agencies may be problematic. This also brings up the issue of responsibilities 
and power balances between different agencies.  
It is furthermore stated that “The Swedish Security Service is also in the need of the knowledge 
and information that is locally situated in order to be able to efficiently execute their mission” 
(Skr. 2014/15:16). As such, local authorities (municipalities) are encouraged to provide 
information to SÄPO (Skr. 2014/15:12,14, 16). The goals of local agencies, e.g. social services, 
are usually to provide social care, whilst SÄPO seeks to control. The former does not use 
repressive measures, whilst the latter is repressive force with monopoly of violence. When 
social policy actors and their practices are subordinated the logic of security and social control, 
there is a potential for the blurring of the functions of care and control. Such a possible meshing 
is ethically problematic and it may also hamper social policy actors’ ability to live up to their 
stated goals and, in that sense collaboration could be counterproductive. Additionally, a 
“securitization” of social policy poses questions pertaining to confidentiality and trust (c.f. 
Ragazzi 2017:170f). Finally, private actors must do one’s bit. Private actors shall, together with 
official agencies, develop risk and vulnerability analysis; and if they encounter something 
suspicious they have, in accordance with their report obligation, to notify authorities (Skr. 
2014/15:17,18, 25). Taken as a whole, these example of collaboration shed light on some of the 
potential perils of collaboration: discrepancies pertaining to the goal of the different actors, 
issues regarding confidentiality, responsibilities and power balances; and, last but not least, the 
risk of counterproductively. Other barriers to a successful collaboration may be lack of inter-
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organizational trust (unwillingness to share information), lack of expertise, different economic 
resources, and perhaps even diverse political agendas (Crawford and Evans 2017:815).  
I would like to make some final comments on the strategy of 2015. Like the previous strategy, 
the strategy of 2015 is similar to its predecessor in several aspects. Border controls, international 
collaboration and secret cohesive measures (made permanent in 2015) is still part of the counter 
terrorism package. Despite these similarities, I would argue that there is a significant difference 
between the strategy of 2015 and its predecessor, namely the pursuit of security, sustained by 
the vocabulary of risks. Although signs of this future development could be identified already 
in strategy of 2012, its terminological toolkit is far more evolved in 2015.The terms “individuals 
at risk”, “risk assessment”, “risk manuals”, “risk groups” and “problem-oriented policing” all 
belong to a prevention that follows the rationale of security first (c.f. Beck 1992). The mentality 
of risk is also apparent when it comes to notion of collaboration. Faith in the tradition criminal 
justice establishment seems insufficient, and under the umbrella of collaboration, the task of 
preventing crime (terrorism) is distributed in all directions from the national state; upwards to 
international organizations (e.g. the EU), downwards to regional or local authorities, and 
sideways to civil society, non-government organizations, and even to citizen. This new way of 
governing crime, also referred to as “the preventive turn”, not only re-structures responsibilities 
for crime control and security. It also re-articulate the relations between the state, market and 
civil society (c.f Crawford and Evans 2017:798f). 
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9 Framing Terrorism  
 
In this section I will present a summary of how terrorism is framed as a severe, constantly 
evolving threat within the three Swedish strategies (c.f. Baker-Beall 2014). I intend to take all 
three strategies into account, as I believe that they, together, could be viewed as representing a 
narrative (social problem formula story) on terrorism.  
Although there is a lack of definition in the Swedish strategies, terrorism is portrayed as an act 
perpetrated by non-state-actors, or non-parliamentary groups and individuals (. e.g. “lone-
wolfs” and “returners”). This construction of the terrorist as a non-state actor serves to obscure 
the potential of state terrorism. Although there are three types of terrorism in the strategies: left 
wing, right wing, and “the new terrorism” (drawing inspiration from Al- and its offspring Isis), 
the policy authors construct the problem of terrorism as mainly consisting of the threat posed 
by the, so called “new”, terrorism. The comprehension of terrorism is mainly sustained by a 
silence pertaining to the other two types of terrorism. By presenting the “new” terrorism as 
another facet and/or branch of already established problems, e.g. the “old” terrorism, traditional 
crime and the risk associated with globalization, it appears somewhat familiar. The “new” 
terrorism is, furthermore, portrayed as a religiously inspired international form of terrorism, 
and its adherent’s modus operandi suicide attacks, is portrayed as a means to yield as high a 
number of civilian casualties as possible. Such an indiscriminate violence, naturally, evokes 
fear. By appeals to emotion and logics, the “new” terrorism is perceived as threatening to violate 
the cultural theme of “right to life”, democracy and the symbolic entity “our fundamental 
values”, a threat that might also incite fear. Overall, fear is the most prominent emotion, and 
within the social problems game it may be seen as a favorable emotion, in the sense that, it may 
function to encourage audience member to care, and to evaluate terrorism as an intolerable 
condition.   
To illustrate the physical harm done, examples of implemented attacks and their casualties in 
recent years in Europe are given (in the strategy of 2015). This may contribute to the perception 
of terrorism as a widespread problem. The parameters of the “new” terrorism changes, and as 
a consequence new and somewhat modified features are emphasized, such as the international 
dimension in 2008: “lone wolfs” in 2012 and “returners” (and once again, “lone-wolfs”) in 
2015. These changes may underpin the idea of the liquid nature of the “new” terrorism.  
The construction of terrorism as a social problem also entails the construction of identities. The 
construction of “us”, as an opposite to an external “other”, is present on different occasions: in 
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the case of border controls: in the division between “fragile” states in need of help and those 
states assigned the task of helping. However, the construction of “us” is not merely strengthened 
in relation to an external “other”, but also in relation to an internal “other” via the idea of the 
“lone-wolf”. These binary constructions do not merely illustrate one way in which meaning is 
created through categorization; but they do also reflect larger (geo)political power relations. 
Although categorizations are a natural part of people’s ways of making sense of the world, the 
power relations reflected in the binary constructions may help us to understand ways in which 
we are governed (c.f. Bacchi 2009:9). An elucidating example is the binary construction of 
“democratic” and “anti-democratic” behaviors, in which the morale of desirable and 
undesirable ways of living shine through. Herein, people are encouraged to “chose” a 
democratic way of living and if they do so they may make sense of themselves as “good”, 
democratic citizens.  
The construction of terrorism as a social problem builds on three key concept: terrorism (that 
which ought to be prevented), democracy (that which ought to be protected) and radicalization 
(that which causes terrorism). Throughout the strategies there is a silence pertaining to possible 
explanations of the key-concepts. Such silence naturally results in a certain degree of vagueness 
as to their meaning. Their meanings have to be assumed or inferred, an audience may hence, 
freely “fill in the blanks”. When doing so people may turn to typifications, and or even 
stereotypes (Loseke 2003:54f). In the current political climate in Europe, Muslims are at risk 
of being apprehended as the enemy (c.f. Fekete 2004; Pantazi and Pemberton 209). Vagueness 
may, however, not always be viewed as something undesirable. Gunnar Fredriksson 
(1992:92ff) holds that vagueness is a necessary component of the political language as, political 
concepts, have to be arbitrary, paradoxical and its meaning changeable. This applies not least 
in the case of terrorism. A crystal clear definition of terrorism, including the terrorist, ought not 
to be desirable as the definition of the terrorist is a highly varied. Vagueness may hence – in the 
context of terrorism – be seen as an asset as it makes the meaning of key-concepts contestable, 
and hence changeable. Unspecified key-concepts may not only contribute to a desirable 
vagueness, but it this vagueness may also reflects the complexity inherited in the problem of 
terrorism.  
Although Loseke’s perspective has proven fruitful when analyzing terrorism as a social 
problem, I nevertheless think that she fails to acknowledge that the study of social problems 
may also, in and of itself, be viewed as a social practice. By studying the social construction of 
social problems, one also, in a sense, contributes to the human activity of constructing social 
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problems. What’s more, I have encountered some difficulties in utilizing her analytical tools. 
The first is to do with Loseke’s separation of social structures (e.g. the welfare system) and 
social forces (e.g. discrimination). To me, it was a bit complicated to tell them apart, although 
the shortcomings of the former may, possibly, be viewed to cause the latter. 
Another concern regards the notion of domain expansion. The focus on the “lone-wolf” in the 
strategy of 2012 resulted in an enhanced emphasis on the domestic realm, and a lesser concern 
about an international dimension. According to Loseke domain expansion is at hand when the 
contents of an already established problem are expanded. In this case, however, the idea newly 
introduced idea of the “lone-wolf” serve not to expand the domains of terrorism, rather to 
change its focus toward the domestic realm. I think that Loseke’s domain expansion fails to 
recognize that, what may appear to be an expansion, may actually lead to a change of focus. In 
the social problems game, a constant adding of new content may create complexity; hence a 
change of focus may be favorable as it may contribute to the preservation of the simplicity of a 
social problem. My last concern has to do with “piggybacking”. To understand how familiarity 
is constructed by examining how one social problem feeds on the achieved level of acceptance 
of other already established problems is, indeed, an inspiring analytical thought. However, 
Loseke, in my opinion, fails to answer the question: how many times may a condition “ride” on 
the back (“piggybacking”) of other, already established problems before its becomes its own?  
 
9.1 Counter-terrorism in the United Kingdom  
 
In this section I will provide a very brief overview of how the United Kingdom’s strategy for 
countering terrorism (CONTEST) came about. I then intend to account for some of the 
controversies which have been at hand in relation to the British framework of counter-terrorism. 
Thereafter, I will discuss how the Swedish responses to terrorism may be understood in light of 
the aforesaid.  
Great Britain has a long history of responding to and coping with violent acts, referred to as 
acts of terrorism, in particular the “The Troubles” in Northern Ireland. Approximately a year 
before the events of 9/11 UK adopted the Terrorism Act (2000). In this act a changed focus 
from the Irish separatists to the Islamist terror could be noted (a focus that has remained even 
until present day). As of 9/11, to deal with the threat posed by Al-Qaeda and its associates 
became a matter of urgency. This resulted in an embracement of a whole array of counter-terror 
legislation in Britain in ensuing years. The United Kingdom’s counter-terrorism strategy 
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(CONTEST) were first published in 2003, and revised and published in 2006 and 2009, 2011 
(the same year as endorsement of The Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 
(TPIM)). 
The aim of the CONTEST is to “reduce the risk to the UK and our interests overseas from 
terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence” (Home office 
2011:6). The strategy consists of four working streams, known as the “four P’s”: 
Prevent, Pursue, Protect, and Prepare. Out of these, the first P, that is the prevent section, has 
received a considerable amount of attention (Brandy 2016; Pantazi and Pemberton 2009:652). 
Within a scholarly context, concerns have been raised that Great Britain’s responses to the so-
called “new terrorism” are, indeed, problematic. Charlotte Heath-Kelly (2013), is critical of the 
discourse of “radicalization”, central to the prevent section. She holds that the concept makes 
terrorism knowable and governable through the concept of risk. And that the deployment of 
“radicalization” reflects a pre-emptive form of risk governance, in which risk is anticipated as 
the driving principle (c.f. O’Malley 2004). In this climate of risk some parts of the population, 
that is Muslims, are perceived to be both “at risk” and risky (Heath-Kelly 2013:174ff). 
Similarly, other scholar have noted that counter-terrorism measures serve to identify Muslims 
as “the enemy within” (Fekete 2004; Bonino 2012; Pantazi and Pemberton 2009, see also 
Suspect community Hillyard 1993) and; that we, to an increasing extent, are governed through 
risk (and fear), leading to an intensification of a wider culture of surveillance and control 
(Walklate and Mythen 2006, c.f Culture of fear, Furedi 2002).11 These deployments reflect a 
wider preventive development in which preempting threats before they emerge is the guiding 
principle (McCulloch and Pickering 2009; Ericson 2008). This pre-crime logic has, by 
McCulloch and Pickering (2009:640) been described as a new preventive paradigm (c.f. Zender 
2007), characterized by a mentality of risks, and a pursuit for security.  
Within this risk-based paradigm situational crime prevention (e.g. CCTV), rather than social is 
encouraged. The success of the situational crime prevention has, since the late 1980s, been 
observed in the UK, as well as in the US and Australia (c.f. O’Malley 1992:262). The pre-crime 
climate also entails a deployment of new and/or modified laws (usually with repressive 
elements), e.g. the discretionary powers of stop and search (Terrorism Act 2000, section 44), 
Prevention of Terrorism Act (control orders, 2005), and the introduction of the Terrorism 
Prevention and Investigation Measures Act (2011). Additionally, even if the legislation 
                                                          
11 In March 2011, he guardian found, that there were a total number of 1.85 million CCTV: s across UK; this 
corresponding to one camera for every 32 people in UK.  
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regulating the maximum length of pre-charge detention of terrorism suspects has, in turns, been 
modified from 28 (between 2006-2011) till 14 days, it is still the longest within the EU.12 
Alongside these measures there has been an extension of the powers of the police. Several of 
the modified or newly implemented measures risk to undermine due legal process for the 
suspect, as well as the presumption of innocence; and thereby also erode the rule of law (Pantazi 
and Pemberton 2009). Since its formation, the Terrorism Act (2000) has expanded its realm to 
include new offences. UK’s definition of terrorism has been accused of being far too broad, as 
it may comprise politically motivated actions aimed at influencing a government or 
international organization. Such a definition is highly problematic, since it may sustain 
violations of the freedom of speech (Amnesty International 2017). Law enforcement authorities, 
e.g. the police have, due to the extension of powers, been ascribed an increased discretion; and 
due to the vagueness of what and who constitute terrorism and terrorist, there is a danger of 
assumptions of “guilt by association” (McCulloch and Pickering 2009:630; Pantazi and 
Pemberton 2009:652). Amnesty International (2017) has called attention to the fact that several 
of the longstanding laws, and counter-terrorism measures introduced in the UK, are akin to 
those in a regime of emergency. As these are adopted outside a formally declared state of 
emergency, a tendency toward a normalization of exceptional powers may be identified (Zender 
2009:123ff).  
Like “the war on drugs”, the terror preventive work involves an international dimension, which 
allows the national security to extend beyond its sovereign territory. In light of this, another 
disquieting development, namely the blurring of international and national security, may be 
observed (McCulloch and Pickering 2009:637f). Moreover, the preventive work encourages an 
engagement and collaboration between government agencies, and non-governmental actors 
both on national and local levels. Local communities are particularly encouraged to engage on 
several grounds. One rationale is that they may detect warning signs at an early stage. Another 
is that communities also may, in collaboration with other local authorities, such as the police, 
work in a preventive manner in order to prevent young people from becoming radicalized. 
These thoughts could be related to the trend, noted by David Garland (1996), in which central 
government restructures responsibilities of crime control; individuals are – to an increasing 
extent – made responsible for their own security. In a similar fashion, Katja Franko Aas 
(2007:140ff) argue that the state has “outsourced” its responsibility to cater for security. The 
                                                          
12 The-charge detention period in the United Kingdom have ranged from 90-days, to 45, 42, 28 days and today 
the period is 14 days (Amnesty International 2017:47).  
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responsibility to provide for security is given to international organizations, as well private 
actors. The commodification of security to the private sector is particularly problematic, as it 
may lead to an enhancement of punitive and repressive actions. The commodification of 
security also contributes to an uneven allocation of security, on the basis of the individual’s 
recourses; as its follows the play rules of the free market (Zender 2009:49ff, 90f). 
Furthermore, community participation also strives to improve “communication with Muslim 
communities, marginalising extremists and promoting social integration” (Choudhury and 
Fenwick 2011:157). To do so, a mutual relationship of trust and confidence, primarily between 
the police and Muslim communities, is underlined. This targeting of Muslims communities has 
been recognized to contribute to a sense of otherness, and even the creation of a “suspect 
community” (Choudhury and Fenwick 2011:175f; Pantazis and Pemberton 2009).  
All in all, it nonetheless seems as if counter-terrorism measures risk to erode, or at least 
endanger a lot of liberal ideals (e.g. the rule of law and the equal value of every person) which, 
in a democratic society such as that of the United Kingdom ought to be highly valued (Miller 
2009, c.f. Findlay 2007).  
 
9.1.1 A temporal comparison of the Swedish strategies and a reflection of some 
potential pitfalls based on the British literature  
 
In this last section I intend to, with a special focus on preventive ideas, to shed light some salient 
similarities and differences between the three Swedish strategies. Thereafter, I want so make 
some comments on how the Swedish line of thought on counter-terrorism may be understood, 
using British literature on counter-terrorism as a backdrop. 
 
In the strategy of 2008, terrorism is constructed as problem external to Sweden. The root causes 
of terrorism are, in the diagnostic frame, seen to emanate from conflicts and wars occurring in 
fragile states and “conflict zones”. The audience is, mainly, encouraged to care by ways of 
appeals to people’s capacity to care about others (humanitarian themes). As the preventive work 
takes aim at fighting the root causes of terrorism overseas, there may be a blurring of the lines 
between national and international security (c.f McCulloch and Pickering 2009:637f). Similar 
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tendencies have been brought to light in a British context. Within the domestic realm a social 
prevention, including general efforts (primary prevention) aimed at socialization is promoted. 
In the strategy of 2012, the idea of the “lone wolf” turns the gaze toward the threat from 
“within”, and the international dimension is, hence emphasized to a lesser extent. As the threat 
is brought closer to home, the threat scenario is escalated. The encouragement to care is now 
sustained by appeals to fear, as it is now the most salient emotion. The preventive work has 
(compared to the prevention in the previous strategy) – through the notion of radicalization – 
become more selective orientated. To obtain control of individuals in order to detect “signs of 
radicalization” is perceived as the overarching objective. Control is achieved via information, 
and information ought to be collected through collaboration. Collaboration does not only refer 
to a collaboration between authorities, but between authorities, non-governmental agencies and 
even individuals. As individuals are expected to partake in the preventive work e.g. by 
providing information to, SÄPO, it could be argued that individuals – to a greater extend – are 
made responsible for their own safety. Such a reallocation of crime (terror prevention) control 
clearly bear resemblance to the development in the UK (c.f. Garland 1996). Furthermore, it is 
also stated that, the Swedish police may request assistance from the National task force of 
Sweden and even the military. The eventuality that the Swedish military may be used as a 
repressive force against Swedish citizen risks to obscure the division between the police and 
the military (or even war and crime) (c.f Aas 2013:107f). 
In the hitherto latest strategy, that of 2015, the notions of the “lone-wolf” and “returners” retain 
the focus on the domestic realm. Fear is still the most prominent emotion, and as in the previous 
strategy, counteracting radicalization remains the primary objective. A mentality of risk is 
prevalent, and on the basis of the perspective of “push and pull” selective measures ought, at 
an early stage, to be implemented toward those perceived to be at risk (prone to radicalization), 
is encouraged. General preventive measures, e.g. discussions and dialogues, are, hence, no 
longer viewed as part of the preventive work. The temporal cohesive measures mentioned in 
the previous strategies have, since the beginning of 2015, been made permanent. The tendency 
to normalize exceptional measures, and thereby to extend the powers of the police, is akin to 
that observed in the UK. A multi-actor collaboration is still viewed as a key component to a 
successful terror prevention. The national coordinator to safeguard democracy against 
extremism’s (appointed in 2014) is to initiate collaboration projects with the broader society, 
ranging from collaborative arrangements with government authorities, local authorities and 
even with civilians. As several social actors, e.g. social services, whose main mission does not 
51 
 
include crime prevention (and hence not counter-terrorism), are to adopt a mentality of risks, a 
myriad of, in the strategy, unspoken tension may arise. Fredrik, chief of security of a Swedish 
municipality is critical of function of the coordinator. He stresses that the national coordinator 
to safeguard democracy against violent extremism is the state’s way of withdrawing tasks once 
bestowed to the municipalities. Fredrik also express a practical problem, namely the tension 
that is created between the available means and goals of his business, and the demands and 
goals of the national coordinator to safeguard democracy against violent extremism. Per, 
another chief of security of another Swedish municipality, also expresses a critical opinion on 
the development of local policies and recommendations, produced by the municipalities in 
collaboration with the national coordinator. Per hold that the local policies sometimes contain, 
or at least risk to contain recommendations as to registration of onions which are, in fact, 
unlawful. Simon, on the other hand, brings forth another perspective.  At the time when the 
local policies took form and were implemented, Simon worked alongside the national 
coordinator (as does he even today). Simon considered the local policies to be needed, as the 
municipalities and its staff had set up a framework for countering extremism. As the local 
policies took form, the employees of each municipality received useful information about 
extremism. Simon argue that, when they had information sessions with staff and representatives 
from the municipalities it was clear that they overlooked left wing and right wing extremism, 
as they mainly thought about one form of extremism; the religious “Islamic extremism”.  
Some of the Swedish counter-terrorism measures may, doubtlessly, based on British literature 
on the subject, be considered as problematic. The normalization of the exceptional and the 
increasingly blurred terrain between internal and external security, the police and military 
(crime and warfare) and the functions of care and control, ought to be reflected upon.  
The crime prevention Sweden has in some respects, embarked upon a similar path as Great 
Britain. As displayed in the strategies, a prevention that build on socialization is pushed aside 
by a prevention that; through the notion of radicalization (and the perspective of “push and 
pull”, is aimed at a selective part of the population (secondary and tertiary prevention). As the 
preventive work in Sweden stresses the need of an introduction of preventive measures at an 
early stage, a positive development of individuals is – increasingly – subordinated the safety of 
society. The focus on confronting threats before they emerge, simultaneously, fits within the 
wide preventive development observed in the UK (see, McCulloch and Pickering 2009; Ericson 
2008). This development is characterized by a mentality of risk, and a desire to preempt threats 
before they emerge (c.f. McCulloch and Pickering 2009; Zender 2007).  
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The prevention of “early initiatives” may raise several ethical questions, which ought to be 
taken into consideration. To begin with, to implement counter-terrorism measures against 
individuals based on the perception of them being at risk may undermine the presumption of 
innocence; likewise, one may wonder what measures that may be implemented against those 
who have not committed any crime. The idea of preempting threats before they emerge, may, 
also, be put to question. To take action against e.g. small children based on the believe that they, 
in the future, most likely (or possibly?) will turn to deviance, may appear difficult to justify 
ethically. By the same token, it may be problematic to cast suspicion on certain individuals, as 
this may result in stigmatization and in worst case-scenario, contribute to a sort of self-fulfilling 
prophecy (c.f. Merton 1968:477f). Additionally, selective measures, justified on the basis of 
utilitarianism may, in a terror context, adhere to the logic: “to trade off the liberties of a few 
against the security of the majority” (Zender 2009:136); and they may hence risk to effect some 
parts of the population more than other parts (c.f. Sahlin 2000:138ff).  
Collaboration is, in the Swedish material, seen as a task involving multiple actors, governmental 
as well as non-governmental. In the Swedish material, as well as in the British literature on 
counter-terrorism, a trend, in which individuals – increasingly – are made responsible for their 
own safety, is discernible (c.f. Garland 1996). Non-governmental actors are also, under the 
umbrella of collaboration, encouraged to cooperate with the Swedish Security Service and to 
deploy a mentality of risk. It seems as if risk has become the organizing principle for the 
preventive work; or perhaps even for the whole society (c.f. Beck 1992). The preventive work 
of coping with risk, has led to a seemingly increased focus on (control of) individuals, and a 
marginalization of proposal pertaining to changes in social fabric. Hence, in this climate of risk 
wherein security is seen as the superior value, it nonetheless seems as if national security has 
taken precedence over social security. Furthermore, Sahlin holds that a society which prizes 
control, risks to do so at the expense of individual integrity. Along the same lines, Zedner 
(2009:45f) stresses that, if the security of society is seen as the superior value, other values such 
as social equality, may be placed in a backseat position, or even be endangered.  
Despite the aforesaid similarities as to the preventive idea of “early intiatives”, including the 
multi-actor collaborative stance, the Swedish counter-terrorism framework seem to differ from 
that of the UK in several respects. Unlike the UK, Sweden does not promote situational crime 
prevention. Situational measures such as, CCTV primarily aimed at controlling peoples’ 
behaviors trough surveillance, are not part emphasized in the Swedish strategies. Although I 
am not able to answer why is the case, one speculation is that the political climate in Sweden 
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not (yet) welcome an implementation of such measures. It would not be wise to make inferences 
as to a possible emergence of a private security market in Sweden based on the strategies. It 
could, however, be noted that there are no references to private companies, which citizens could 
turn to for security, in the Swedish strategies. 
Another distinct difference between the counter-terrorism framework in Sweden and Britain, 
has to do with the portrayal, or rather, understanding of the enemy. As observed in the British 
literature, Muslims are framed as the “enemy within”. Although I have not studied how the 
enemy is constructed within a British counter-terrorism context, I hold that the enemy is not 
clearly defined within the Swedish material. As noted in the previous section, I think this may 
have to do with the element of vagueness.  
By adding a temporal dimension, I have, like like, Strandh and Eklund, been able to demonstrate 
how the understanding of terrorism has changed in between the strategies. Even though I have 
not studied the impact of focusing events on these changes, my study also points toward the 
importance of the notion of “lone-wolfs” and collaboration. Strand and Eklund uses the notion 
of mitigation to make sense of the identified changes; whilst I have chosen to draw on Sahlin’s 
perspective on crime prevention. Using Sahlin’s thoughts on crime prevention has enabled to 
problematize identified changes; and the British literature on counter-terrorism has, 
furthermore, enabled me to situate identified changes within a broader preventive societal 
development. 
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10. Concluding remarks  
 
In this essay, I have examined the ways in which claim-makers, in this case, the authors of the 
policies conduct the social problems work of persuading audience members that their claims 
about terrorism are believable and important. In doing so, the claim makers make use of 
strategies that are common to successful claims. I have shed light on how they produce a 
package of claims about terrorism which entail: making appeals to logic and emotion, setting 
the parameters of the condition, creating meaning (diagnostic frame) and constructing the 
solutions (prognostic frame). By constructing terrorism as another branch or facet of an already 
established problem (piggybacking), it appears a both a familiar and troublesome condition. 
Through appeals to fear, terrorism is framed as a severe and constantly evolving threat (c.f. 
Baker-Beall 2014). Fear encourages us to evaluate the condition as intolerable, and that which 
we fear, we usually take seriously and deem important. What’s more, the narrative of terrorism 
(social problems formula story) is a moral one, as it conveys desirable and undesirable ways of 
living. It also presents us with the possibility of making sense of ourselves in relation to the 
social world, via the constructions of identities. One example of this is the positing of the 
identity of “us”, both in relation to the external and internal other. Scrutinizing the construction 
of terrorism as a social problem, has not only contributed to an understanding of how it is 
farmed; it also tells us something about larger societal and cultural trends and worries.  
A salient characteristic of the discourse of terrorism is its vagueness. This vagueness may be 
viewed as an asset, since the former is a necessary component of political language. Even 
though Loseke (2003:16f) holds that social problems tend to be reduced to simplified 
conditions, I, nonetheless, hold that elements of vagueness in the narrative of terrorism also 
reflects its complexity. Terrorism threatens not only life and limb, but it also poses a threat 
toward something “bigger”, namely the symbolic entity of “our values”. As this claim is 
symbolic, and hence more far-reaching than it appears on the surface, terrorism may be viewed 
as a condition which reflects larger, more diffuse, cultural worries pertaining to the possible 
rise of anti-democratic values and behaviors. The ways terrorism is framed may not only 
illuminate cultural worries, but it may also perpetuate them.  
As I have discerned in the prognostic frame, one way of preventing and controlling crime is 
through collaborative arrangements. This collaborative multi-actor approach is underpinned a 
mentality of risk, and it is linked to the prevention of “early initiatives”. The focus on “early 
initiatives” to preventing possible future harm reflects a sort of pessimism toward the possible 
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troublesome development of (some) individuals. This pessimism may be related to the mantra 
“nothing works”, and the collapse of the rehabilitative ideal. As the belief in rehabilitation has 
waned, corrective ideals have gained the upper hand. Prevention is seemingly not primarily 
about favoring a positive development, but rather, thwarting negative ones (Sahlin 2000:24f): 
this too reflects a sort of pessimism as to terror prevention. The urge for collaborative 
arrangements signifies an extensive institutional reorganization (c.f. Strandh and Eklund 
2015:276). This development may be reflected upon in three ways, it may;(1) be apprehended 
as a way of “empowering” citizens, and it may also;(2) be a part of the state’s ambition to 
control and police people from a distance, or;(3) it may be viewed as a way of centralizing tasks 
to the state.  
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